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Executive Summary 
This report presents findings from the fourth wave of the 
American Dream Demonstration (ADD) experimental 
study of Individual Development Accounts (IDAs). The 
ADD was a set of 14 privately funded local IDA programs 
initiated in the late 1990s. It was the first large-scale test 
of IDAs in the United States and used a variety of  
research methods in order to learn about IDAs. One of 
these programs, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, was implemented  
as a random assignment experiment. 
 
The ADD experiment, which ran from 1998 to 2003, was 
the first experimental study of IDAs. In total, 1,103  
low-income participants were surveyed at baseline and 
randomly assigned to either the treatment or control 
group. Treatment group members received access to an 
IDA as well as financial education and case management. 
The IDA provided matched withdrawals at a 2:1 rate for 
home purchase and a 1:1 rate for home repair, small  
business investment, post-secondary education, or  
retirement savings. Participants who made the maximum 
matchable deposits throughout the 3 years of the  
program could accumulate $6,750 (plus interest) for a 
home purchase or $4,500 (plus interest) for the other 
qualified uses. 
 
Participants were surveyed at baseline (1998 and 1999), 
again about 18 months later (2000 and 2001), and then 
again in a follow-up survey in 2003, about 48 months 
after random assignment. Many interesting findings 
emerged from these three waves of data collection,  
primarily that the program had a positive, statistically  
significant impact on homeownership rates at Wave 3 
(Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2008; Mills, Gale, Patterson,  
Engelhardt, Eriksen, & Apostolov, 2008). In addition,  
evidence gathered from extended personal interviews 
with 84 experiment participants (59 treatment, 25  
control) suggests positive psychological, cognitive,  
behavioral, and economic effects (Sherraden, McBride, 
Hanson, & Johnson, 2005; Sherraden & McBride, 2010).  
 
While this research provided rigorous evidence of the 
short-term impact of IDAs, there was no evidence on the 
long-term effects of IDA participation. Effects of asset 
building on individuals may not be immediate. To the 
extent that asset building produces changes in behavior 
or attitudes, the effects may take time to manifest.  
Measuring long-term performance is important in  
understanding the true impacts of participation in an  
IDA program.  
 
The purpose of the fourth wave of data collection (ADD4) 
was to assess the impact of short-term IDAs 10 years  
after random assignment (6 years after the program  
ended). To accomplish this, an additional survey was  
conducted among the individuals who participated in  
the Tulsa, Oklahoma, randomized IDA experiment.  
Combining the new survey data with earlier surveys of the 
same individuals made possible rigorous statistical  
analysis of the effects of IDAs on program participants  
6 years after the program ended.  
 
Data collection ran from August 2008 to March 2009 and 
reached 80.1 percent of the baseline sample (855  
individuals, excluding deceased participants and those 
who had emigrated from the United States). The ADD4 
study was designed to address two primary questions:  
 
1. What are the long-term effects of access to an IDA 
program on targeted asset building and overall 
wealth among low-income families? 
2. What are the long-term psychological and health  
effects of access to an IDA program? 
 
Analyses of the data use bivariate and difference-in-
differences estimates and also employ regression  
analyses, controlling for selected baseline characteristics. 
For most continuous outcomes, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression is used. Logistic or probit regressions 
were used for dichotomous outcomes, and Poisson  
regressions were used for count outcomes. In all analyses, 
an alpha of 0.100 was accepted as the threshold for  
identifying significant differences and effects. Unless  
otherwise indicated, 2-tail tests of significance are used 
throughout the report. 
 
In this report, we detail basic investigation into the effect 
of treatment assignment on key outcomes. Each outcome 
will be explored and reported in more detail in future 
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publications. Below we briefly highlight the central results 
of the ADD4 study on the five allowable uses and net 
worth. 
 
Homeownership 
Both the treatment and control groups experienced large 
increases in homeownership between Wave 1 and Wave 
4 and there is no observed significant effect of treatment 
on the level of homeownership among the full sample. 
However, among participants with an above-median  
income at baseline (about $15,480 per year), treatment 
significantly increased both homeownership rates and 
duration of homeownership. 
 
Home maintenance and repair 
For the full sample, there was no impact of the treatment 
on home repairs, the dollar amount spent on repairs, or 
housing price appreciation. Treatment group members 
did report however, that the estimated cost of unmade 
repairs was significantly lower compared with the control 
group. Among baseline homeowners, treatment group 
members experienced a significantly higher rate of  
housing price appreciation and were less likely to report 
foregoing needed repairs.  
 
Education 
There is a significant positive impact on education enroll-
ment among the treatment group at Wave 4. No  
significant impacts are found on increase in level of  
education or degree completion among the full sample. 
Among those who reported high school education or less 
at baseline, there is a significant positive effect on the 
likelihood of gaining “some college” among treatment 
group members compared to the control group. Further, 
we find that men experience a larger effect of treatment 
on education outcomes than women. Specifically, we find 
that men may benefit more from the IDA program in 
terms of educational enrollment and attainment  
compared with women.  
 
Business ownership 
No significant effect of treatment is found on business 
ownership or equity. 
 
Retirement 
There were very high rates of increased retirement saving 
among both the treatment and control group members; 
however, no significant effect of treatment is found on 
retirement savings. 
 
Net worth 
No significant effect of treatment is found on overall net 
worth. There is a marginally significant but economically 
small effect found on liquid assets: assignment to  
treatment is associated with $79 more in liquid assets 
relative to assignment to control. 
 
 
Summary 
 
In examining the five allowable uses, the study finds some 
impacts of IDAs on education, especially for males, and 
on home maintenance and repair 10-years after the  
program.  However, we find no impact on home-
ownership, businesses, and retirement savings in the  
follow-up study. The positive findings for education and 
home maintenance and repair may suggest that IDAs are 
best suited to support asset purchases that can be  
accomplished incrementally over a period of time.  
Targeting IDAs for education and home maintenance and 
repair may be more effective than applying them to  
“all-or-nothing” purchases like a house.  
 
These findings may suggest two implications for the field 
of asset-building for low and moderate-income house-
holds. First, the findings imply that program benefits may 
have to be greater or that programs may need to have 
longer savings periods in order to result in lasting impacts 
on wealth and asset accumulation. Second, long-term 
impacts of a three-year program may be a lot to expect. 
The findings raise a broader question of whether a  
short-term program that provides modest benefits to 
program participants can outweigh the many other  
factors that influence ones’ social and economic  
outcomes. Finally, the results highlight the importance  
of using experimental design in generating  
evidence-based policy. 
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Chapter 1 
Background on Asset Building and IDAs 
Saving and Asset Building: An Overview 
What is the best way to help low-income people improve 
their long-term economic prospects? Public polices in 
the United States have historically focused on a  
combination of income maintenance, consumption  
support, and work incentives to help families meet daily 
needs. While these policies help families manage in the 
short-term, they may not increase long-term financial 
stability. In recent years, an additional approach has 
aimed to complement traditional policies by helping  
low-income households save and accumulate wealth 
with the goal of increasing their longer-term economic 
prospects.  
 
These programs, such as matched savings and tax-time 
savings programs, provide subsidies to encourage  
low-income individuals to save for the purchase of  
specific assets, such as a home, or for general asset-
building needs, such as an emergency fund or clearing 
debt, and have become a policy option implemented by 
governments in countries around the world.  
 
These programs provide one policy tool to help address 
growing wealth inequality in the United States. A large 
number of studies have highlighted that wealth in the 
United States is unequally distributed and highly  
concentrated (Keister & Moller, 2000; Kopczuk & Saez, 
2004; Wolff, 2010). Furthermore, wealth inequality has 
increased over the past few decades. In 2009, the net 
worth of the wealthiest 1% of American households was 
225 times larger than that of the median American 
household, the highest ratio on record (Allegretto, 2011). 
Racial disparities in assets and wealth are also extreme: 
the latest data indicate a striking inequality of median 
net worth of whites compared to African Americans 
(20:1) and Hispanics (18:1) (Oliver & Shapiro, 2006; 
Kochhar, Fry, & Taylor, 2011).  
 
Beyond the goal of encouraging wealth accumulation 
and addressing growing inequities, several research  
findings may drive policy support for saving by  
low-income people.  
 
1. The United States already has many public policies 
that encourage asset accumulation via saving  
2. incentives, mortgage interest tax deductions, and 
other means. However, lower-income households 
often have little or no access to such savings  
structures, and these benefits primarily accrue to 
people in the top half of the income distribution 
(Sherraden, 1991; Howard, 1993; Seidman, 2001).  
A report from the Annie E. Casey Foundation and 
Corporation for Economic Development (CFED) on 
the federal asset-building budget finds that the  
bottom 60% of taxpayers receive only 4% of federal  
asset-building tax expenditures (Woo, Rademacher,  
& Meirer, 2010).  
3. Compared to income-transfer approaches to poverty 
reduction, asset-development approaches may have 
greater potential to foster financial stability 
(McKernan & Sherraden, 2008; Moser & Dani, 2008). 
4. While the acquisition of major non-financial assets 
(e.g., a house) can transform a household’s standard 
of living, the up-front financial cost may be out of 
reach for low-income people (Shapiro, 2004).  
5. The process of accumulating assets may, in itself, alter 
people’s outlooks and choices. The asset-effect, as it 
is sometimes called, is hypothesized to make a  
person more future-oriented, to increase the sense of 
personal efficacy, and to enhance some positive  
behaviors and attitudes (Sherraden, 1991). 
6. People need savings to weather temporary setbacks 
such as a spell of unemployment or an unexpected 
expense. 
 
As a response to the current asset-building policy  
structure that favors higher-income households,  
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) were proposed 
as a way to include everyone in asset building (Sherraden, 
1991). IDAs were proposed as universal, progressive  
savings plans, beginning as early as birth, with the aim of 
making asset-building policy life-long and fully inclusive 
of the population (Sherraden, 1991). Instead, bowing to 
practical realities and the challenge of creating a full-scale 
and inclusive policy, IDAs were implemented throughout 
the United States during a demonstration period as  
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short-term subsidized savings programs targeted to  
lower-income adults.  
 
There has been limited short-term analysis of the  
effectiveness and efficiency of IDA programs, and no long
-term analysis. Given the growing interest in asset-
building strategies, policy-makers need to know if these 
programs have an impact over the long run and whether 
they are cost-effective. This report presents findings from 
the fourth wave of the American Dream Demonstration 
(ADD) experimental study of IDAs, which was designed to 
help answer these questions.  
 
The purpose of the fourth wave of data collection (ADD4) 
was to assess the 10-year impact of a short-term (3-year) 
IDA program. To accomplish this, we conducted a fourth 
survey of individuals who participated in the Tulsa,  
Oklahoma, randomized IDA experiment that ran from 
1998 to 2002 as a part of the ADD. Combining the new 
survey data with earlier surveys of the same individuals 
enabled us to conduct rigorous statistical analysis of the 
effects of IDA eligibility on the subsidized assets and on 
wealth, earnings, health, and psychological outcomes of 
IDA participants ten years after the program began. In 
addition, the ADD4 study includes a cost-benefit analysis 
of the Tulsa IDA program, which is presented in a  
separate report. 
 
The Need for Asset-Building Policies 
The overall perspective guiding this work is that poverty 
and well-being, while typically measured as income levels, 
are not determined solely by income. Accumulated  
savings and other assets also matter (Oliver and Shapiro, 
2006; Shapiro, 2001; Sherraden, 1991). 
 
Millions of households in the United States have  
accumulated little or no savings and have few assets. 
Many more families are “asset poor” than “income poor.” 
While the official (income-based) poverty rate in 2006 
was 12.3%, the asset poverty rate was almost 26%
1 
(U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2011; CFED, 2009). Families with children 
are even more likely to be asset-poor: 31% of families 
with children live in asset poverty. When only liquid assets 
are considered, this number rises to 52% (Aratani & Chau, 
2010). In other words, over half of U.S. families could not 
support themselves at the poverty-level for three months 
if they lost their income.  
 
Examination of economic disparities in the United States 
indicates that different social groups experience different 
extents and magnitudes of income and asset inequalities. 
As noted in the prologue, the U.S. faces growing asset 
inequality by income and by race. Among households 
with children, minority households and female-headed 
households are more likely to live in asset poverty 
(Wiedrich, Crawford, & Tivol, 2010).  
 
These patterns have not arisen randomly, nor do they  
result solely from individuals “making choices” in the  
market. Historically, asset inequality has been influenced 
by officially—or quasi-officially—sanctioned institutions 
including land confiscation, slavery, Jim Crow laws,  
residential discrimination, targeting of FHA mortgages to 
white homeowners, targeting of USDA programs in the 
South to white farmers, unequal educational opportunity, 
red-lining, and predatory lending. These and other  
institutional arrangements have generated wealth  
inequalities over a long period of time (Oliver and 
Shapiro, 2006). 
 
Today, the non-poor benefit from institutional structures 
that encourage asset building, including auto-enrollment 
in savings programs, default savings choices and targets, 
automatic deposits, and, sometimes, large public  
subsidies (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999;  Beverly et al., 2008; 
Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2004; Madrian & Shea, 2001; 
Sherraden & Barr, 2005). In this regard, the United States 
has created policies that build assets of the non-poor 
(e.g., 401(k) plans) that include both paternalistic  
structures and large public subsidies through tax benefits. 
The poor have little or no access to such savings  
structures and subsidies. Thus, current public policy  
exacerbates asset inequality (Dynarski, 2004; Howard, 
1997; Seidman, 2001; Sherraden, 1991; Woo et al., 2010).  
1. Asset poverty here is defined as net worth below three months of poverty-level income. 
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As an asset-building policy targeted to lower-income 
households, IDAs have provided subsidized saving  
opportunities to low-income families. It is important to 
note that, for most IDA participants in the ADD, saving is 
not automatic as in many 401(k) accounts—most IDA 
participants must take action to save each month.  
Low-income families do save in IDA accounts, though 
not surprisingly saving remains very difficult (Schreiner  
& Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden & McBride, 2010).  
 
Growth of IDAs 
IDAs have proven to be popular and have garnered  
bi-partisan support in the United States. Over the last 
decade, over 1,000 IDA programs with more than 85,000 
account holders have been created (CFED, 2011).  
Community-based IDA initiatives have received support 
from foundations, financial institutions, other corporate 
sponsors, private donors, and from local, state, and  
federal government.  
 
Federal funding was allocated to support IDA programs 
with the enactment of the Assets for Independence Act 
(AFIA) in 1998. The Assets for Independence Program 
(AFI) is now the largest funding source of IDAs in the 
United States, with AFI-sponsored IDA programs in 49 
states and the District of Columbia. From1998 to 2009, 
the program provided $180 million in competitive grant 
funds to community-based organizations to support 
nearly 600 IDA projects. AFI programs have provided 
more than 72,000 low-income participants with access to 
IDAs, resulting in more than 29,000 asset purchases, such 
as houses, post-secondary education, and micro-
enterprise. 
 
Proposals to expand IDAs were a staple of the federal 
budget during both the Clinton and the George W. Bush 
administrations. More recently, the Obama administra-
tion has promoted savings in general through proposals 
such as the Saver‘s Bonus, which would provide a tax 
credit to match low-income individuals’ savings. Thus, 
promoting asset-building for low-income households 
continues to generate interest at the federal level. 
 
Research on IDAs 
Several studies on the efficacy and impact of IDAs  
conducted over the past two decades have provided  
insights into the savings and asset-building behaviors of 
low-income households. The Canadian learn$ave study 
and the American Dream Demonstration’s experimental 
study are the only randomized controlled trials of IDAs to 
date.  
 
The Canadian learn$ave study is the largest experimental 
demonstration of matched savings accounts. This  
experiment tested the use of IDAs to support adult  
education and micro-enterprise development among 
nearly 5,000 individuals in ten locations across Canada 
(about 3,500 in the experimental component). The 
learn$ave experiment also tested the impact of additional 
services including financial education and intensive case 
management.  
 
The longitudinal research, conducted from 2001 to 2008, 
includes four waves of data collection with post-
participation follow-up. Compared with the control group, 
treatment members demonstrated increased enrollment 
in training and education programs. There was no  
significant effect on net worth or total savings but 
learn$ave did appear to affect the overall composition of 
financial assets and have a positive impact on financial 
Asset building has also received increasing  
attention in other countries. Versions of IDA  
projects are being implemented in Australia, 
Canada, Hong Kong, Korea, Mozambique,  
Peru, Taiwan, and Uganda.  
There has also been interest— 
in the United States and other countries 
—in Children’s Development Accounts.  
These accounts aim to encourage the lifelong 
habit of saving by promoting saving during 
childhood (Cramer, O’Brien, & Boshara, 2007).  
 5 
  
 
goal setting, ongoing saving activities, and budgeting. 
Treatment group members had higher average bank  
account balances and lower retirement savings than  
control group members. Results suggest that the  
additional provision of financial education and case  
management resulted in a higher likelihood of saving, of 
qualifying for matched credits, and of saving the  
maximum matchable amount. Though these additional 
services had little impact on withdrawal of matching 
funds, they did significantly increase educational  
outcomes (Leckie, Hui, Tattrie, Robson, & Voyer, 2010). 
Research from non-experimental studies of IDAs has 
yielded additional findings. These studies include studies 
using quasi-experimental designs as well as studies with 
no comparison group that draw data from participant 
surveys and/or account monitoring. While these findings 
do not come from randomized controlled trials and may 
differ from experimental findings, they can still provide 
some insight into savings contributions and participant 
experiences in IDAs. 
 
Non-experimental research has identified several factors 
associated with a greater likelihood of contributing to an 
IDA. Analysis of account monitoring data from the 14 
ADD projects shows that use of direct deposit, higher 
match rates, and higher match caps are associated with 
increased likelihood of contributing to an IDA. Of these, 
only higher match caps are also associated with higher 
monthly deposits. Participants with higher levels of  
education and working students were more likely than 
other participants to make account contributions.  
Financial education is correlated with increased  
contributions in several studies. Research from the ADD 
finds that every hour of financial education, up to 8 hours 
total is helpful; additional hours beyond this point may 
have a negative effect on saving. Conversely, debt may be 
a barrier to saving: participants with debt are less likely to 
make account contributions and make lower average 
monthly deposits in the IDA (Schreiner, Clancy, &  
Sherraden, 2002; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). 
 
Evidence from non-experimental research also suggests 
that IDAs encourage the purchase of assets among  
participants. Using a comparison group drawn from the 
2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation, the 
first AFI Evaluation estimates that AFI IDA participation 
increases the rates of homeownership, business owner-
ship, and enrollment in postsecondary education (Mills, 
Lam, DeMarco, Rodger, & Kaul, 2008). No significant  
differences between participants and nonparticipants 
were found on savings, home equity, or consumer debt. 
There is also evidence that IDAs may improve mortgage 
loan terms and protect low-income households from 
foreclosure. A report by CFED and The Urban Institute 
compared IDA homebuyers with other low-income  
homebuyers purchasing homes in the same communities 
between 1999 and 2007. The study finds that IDA home 
purchasers were much less likely to have high-interest 
mortgage terms and two to three times less likely to  
experience foreclosure (Rademacher, Wiedrich,  
McKernan, Ratcliffe, & Gallagher, 2010). 
 
The American Dream Demonstration and the 
Tulsa Experiment  
The American Dream Demonstration (ADD) is a set of 14 
privately funded local IDA programs initiated in the late 
1990s. The ADD is the first large-scale test of IDAs in the 
United States and used a variety of research methods to 
learn about IDAs (Schreiner et al., 2002).  
 
The IDA program in Tulsa, Oklahoma, was administered 
by Community Action Project of Tulsa County (CAPTC) 
and was the only ADD program that was implemented as 
a random assignment experiment. CFED proposed and 
organized the ADD intervention. The ADD research  
program was conceived and initiated by the Center for 
Social Development (CSD) at Washington University in St. 
Louis. For the ADD experiment, the CSD organized the 
selection of the site and the survey firm, and drafted the 
initial survey instrument. Abt Associates was selected to 
conduct random assignment, data collection and initial 
analysis. 
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The Community Action Project of Tulsa County (CAPTC) 
 
CAPTC is a multi-service community action agency that serves the low-income population of the Tulsa metropolitan area. 
The organization was founded in 1973 and in 1998 described itself as follows: 
 
“The Community Action Project of Tulsa County (CAPTC, formerly known as Project Get Together) is a comprehensive 
anti-poverty agency with a 24-year history of providing a variety of services to low-income people. CAPTC’s mission is to 
help individuals and families in economic need achieve self-sufficiency through emergency aid, medical care, housing, 
community development, education, and advocacy in an atmosphere of respect. Last year, our various programs served 
nearly 18,000 low-income households. 
 
“CAPTC focuses intently on its mission: to help individuals and families in need achieve self-sufficiency. All programs and 
services – current and potentially future – are evaluated and assessed based on their capacity to contribute to the ac-
complishment of our self-sufficiency directive. 
 
“One of the major priorities which the Board of Directors has established for CAPTC’s future program expansion is the 
development of alternative financial services to those currently available to our low income clients. One of those new 
services is the Individual Development Accounts program.” 
 
Source: Community Action Project of Tulsa County, “The IDA Program of CAPTC – Informational Packet,” 1998. As cited in 
Abt Associates Inc. “Evaluation of the American Dream Demonstration, Final Evaluation Report,” 2004.  
The ADD Experiment 
Selection into the Program 
Recruitment of participants for the experiment took place 
over a 15-month period from October 1998 to December 
1999. CAPTC reached out to clients who received other 
services, such as tax preparation assistance and home-
ownership preparation classes, to participate in the ADD 
IDA program. The program was also advertised in local 
media, and flyers were mailed to former clients and  
distributed at other local social service agencies. Those 
who indicated an interest in the program were  
encouraged to fill out an application, documenting  
their eligibility.  
 
To be eligible for the program, participants had to be  
employed (confirmed with pay stubs) and have a prior 
year’s income below 150% of the federal poverty line 
(verified using the 1997 or 1998 income tax return  
adjusted gross income; about $25,000 for a family of 
four). Applicants who appeared to meet the criteria were 
invited for an interview that confirmed the content of 
their application, explained the program and the random 
assignment process, and obtained informed consent. 
 
Participants in the ADD experiment were informed of the 
nature and goals of the IDA program and notified that, 
regardless of whether they were assigned to the  
treatment or control group, they would not be able to use 
other matched savings programs at CAPTC, nor could 
they receive any financial assistance for homeownership 
from CAPTC for the four years of the study period.  
 
As a result, during the experimental period through 2003, 
treatment group members had access to the CAPTC IDA, 
while both control and treatment group members could 
access a set of other subsidy options at CAPTC that were 
less attractive than those available to the typical low-
income household. All sample members could use CAPTC 
services for tax preparation, employment, education, child 
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Figure 1.1    
ADD Experiment Timeline 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Randomization                                                                                                 
Baseline Survey                                                                                                 
Saving Period                                                                                                 
Wave 2 Survey                                                                                                 
Cash-out period                                                                                                 
Wave 3 Survey                                                                                                 
Wave 4 Survey                                                                                                 
care, and so on during the experiment period. Control 
group members could receive homeownership counsel-
ing from CAPTC and, if they requested it, they were pro-
vided with general financial information and referrals to 
other agencies in the Tulsa area that provided similar ser-
vices. At these other agencies, control group members 
were free to seek any service for which they qualified, 
including financial assistance for homeownership. After 
2003, all participants reverted to being eligible for all 
CAPTC  
programs.  
 
Treatment group members had access to financial  
education, case management, and IDA matched savings 
accounts held at the Bank of Oklahoma.  
 
 The account earned an interest rate of 2 to 3%.2  
 Participants could receive matches for up to $750 in 
deposits each year, with deposits above $750 in a 
given year eligible to be matched in subsequent 
years.
3 
 
 Participants could make matchable deposits for 36 
months after opening the account.  
 Unmatched withdrawals could be made at any time.  
 Matched withdrawals could only be made six or more 
months after account opening.  
 Withdrawals were matched at 2:1 rate for home  
 purchase and 1:1 for home repair, small business  
 investment, post-secondary education, and  
 retirement savings.  
 A participant who made the maximum matchable 
deposit in all three years could accumulate $6,750 for 
a home purchase or $4,500 for other qualified uses.  
 At the end of the program, participants could request 
to put any remaining IDA balance into a Roth IRA 
with a 1:1 match.  
 
The financial education component included both general 
money-management training and asset-specific training.
4
   
The general financial education consisted of six 2-hour 
courses on topics such as saving strategies, budgeting, 
credit repair, and financial planning. The asset-specific 
classes provided information on a particular asset  
investment. For example, participants who were saving for 
a home attended classes that addressed how to shop in 
the real estate market and how to work with real estate 
agents and loan officers. Program staff provided program 
participants with assistance and consultation by phone or 
in-person, and they sent out monthly postcards urging 
participants to make deposits in their accounts. 
2.  There were no fees to open or withdraw from the account unless the respondent made more than three withdrawals in one year, which in-
duced a $3 fee. They could also use direct deposit to transfer money automatically into the IDA. 
3.  However, individuals who contributed less than $750 in a year were not allowed the following year to make “catch-up” deposits retrospective-
ly.  
4.  Participants were required to attend a minimum of four hours of financial education before they were allowed to open the account and to 
accrue 12 hours of general financial education, as well as some asset-specific training, before making a matched withdrawal.  
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A total of 1,147 applicants were found to meet the  
eligibility requirements and were referred for baseline 
interview and random assignment. 
 
The Baseline Sample 
Baseline interviews were conducted by telephone using a 
computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) system. 
Because the baseline interviews preceded random  
assignment, the characteristics measured there can be 
assumed to be strictly exogenous to subsequent  
Table 1.1 
Baseline Sample (N=1,103) 
  
Mean/
percentage 
Standard 
deviation 
Total household income (monthly) 1,422 744 
Age 35.8 10.3 
Female 78.4  
Bank account ownership 83.7  
Married 27.8 
Homeowner 21.7 
Children in home 77.2 
Welfare recipient 27.3 
Race 
Caucasian 44.3 
African American 42.5 
Other 13.2 
Education 
HS degree or less 33.8 
Some college 41.1 
College graduate 25.1 
Assets 
Less than 1 month of assets 23.6 
1-2 months of assets 10.8 
2-3 months of assets 8.7 
3+months of assets 43.2 
Missing on assets 13.7 
Debts 
Less than 1 month of debts 21.2 
1-2 months of debts 7.2 
2-3 months of debts 5.4 
3+months of debts 47.6 
Missing on debts 18.6 
treatment. A total of 1,103 baseline interviews were  
completed, usually two weeks after the application  
interview. A plurality of applicants was recruited near the 
end of the recruitment window. Respondents interviewed 
during the last three months of the recruitment period 
(October-December 1999) comprise 30% of the total 
sample. 
 
At baseline, the respondents were predominantly female 
(78%), had children (77%), and were not married (28% 
married). Forty-four percent of baseline respondents were 
white and 43% were African-American. A plurality had 
attended some college (41%) and 84% had either a 
checking or a savings account. The average age of  
respondents was 35 years. At baseline, 22% of  
respondents owned their residence. The mean monthly 
household income was $1,422 (median $1,320) while 
about a quarter of respondents held assets worth less 
than one month of the sample average income and nearly 
half had liabilities exceeding three months sample  
average income.  
 
Random Assignment 
Within one week of their baseline interview, Abt  
Associates randomly assigned those with completed  
interviews to the treatment or control group and CAPTC 
notified respondents of their assignment. At the outset of 
the sampling, the assignment ratio was five treatments to 
six control group members because of concerns about 
differential attrition. About half-way through the  
recruitment period, the assignment ratio was adjusted to 
one treatment to one control. In total, 537 were assigned 
to the treatment group and 566 were assigned to the 
control group.  
 
Waves 2 and 3 
The Wave 2 survey was conducted between May 2000 
and August 2001, about 18 months after baseline  
interview and random assignment. An interview with  
respondents was first attempted by telephone. If  
telephone attempts were unsuccessful, a field interviewer 
attempted to arrange an in-person interview at the  
respondent’s residence. The response rate for Wave 2 was 
84.6%. The Wave 3 survey followed the same process  
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opened an IDA account, unless otherwise noted. 
Overall, at account opening, the most popular savings 
goal among account openers, as shown in Figure 1.2,  
was home purchase (48% of treatment group members), 
followed by home repair (19%) and retirement savings 
(19%). Less than 10% intended to save for post-secondary 
education or for microenterprise. On average, those in 
the treatment group made deposits in about half of the 
months they had access to their account. Monthly net 
deposits averaged $18 per month, with an average of 
$1,549 in gross deposits during the program period.  
 
About 70% of participants took an unmatched withdrawal 
at some point. About 40% made a matched withdrawal, 
receiving on average $721 in matching funds. Consistent  
 
with reasons for saving, matched withdrawals were made 
in roughly equal proportions for home purchase (13%), 
home repair (14.%), and retirement (13%). Fewer  
participants made withdrawals for education (7%) and 
small business (3%). Twenty-seven percent of the sample 
made withdrawals for their originally stated savings  
purpose, while 10% made matched withdrawals for  
multiple purposes, and a total of 26% made withdrawals 
for purposes other than their originally stated intention.  
 
 
 
between January and September 2003, about 48 months 
after random assignment, with a 76.2% response rate.  
The average interval between the baseline and Wave 3 
interviews was 1,449 days for treatment cases and 1,456 
days for controls; the difference is not statistically  
significant. Interviews were conducted using  
computer-assisted telephone and personal interviewing 
methods.  
 
Program Use 
Table 1.2 describes program use among those assigned 
to the treatment group (n=537). Of those assigned to 
treatment, 87.9% opened an IDA account (n=472). In 
keeping with the intent-to-treat approach used in this 
report, reported account-use figures include all those 
assigned to treatment, independent of whether they 
Table 1.2 
Program Use Among Treatment Group Respondents 
(N=537) 
 Mean/
proportion 
Account use   
Average monthly net deposit ($) 18 
Average gross deposits ($) 1,549 
Deposit frequency 0.50 
Unmatched withdrawals   
Took any unmatched withdrawal 0.70 
Value of unmatched withdrawals ($) 552 
Matched withdrawals   
Received any match 0.39 
Value of matched withdrawals ($) 574 
Value of match funds received ($) 721 
Proportion who made matched withdrawals for   
Home purchase 0.13 
Home repair 0.14 
Education 0.07 
Retirement 0.13 
Business 0.03 
Took match for intended savings goal* 0.27 
Took match for reason other than original  
reason for saving* 
0.26 
Matched withdrawals for multiple purposes 0.10 
* n=472 who opened IDA accounts   
Figure 1.2 
Reason for Saving Among Treatment Group Respondents 
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Table 1.3 describes program use by baseline-reported 
reason for saving for those assigned to treatment who 
opened accounts and responded to the 10-year  
follow-up survey. More than 70% of participants saving 
for home repair, education, or retirement took a matched 
withdrawal. Only about half of those saving for small 
business made a matched withdrawal, while savers for 
home purchase had the lowest likelihood of making a 
matched withdrawal (18%). Based on all metrics,  
participants saving for home repair saved on average $39 
per month and $2,278 total. Deposit frequency and 
probability of withdrawal were also highest among those 
saving for home repair. 
 
Although home purchase was the most popular reason 
for saving in the program, these savers had the lowest 
program-use outcomes, depositing only $9.30 per month 
and accumulating at the mean $1,400 over the course of 
the program.   With the 2:1 match rate, this would result 
in $4,200 to put toward a down payment on a home.  
 
Findings from Waves 1—3 
The effects of the experiment on homeownership and 
wealth through 2003 were presented in three recent  
articles (Grinstein-Weiss, et al., 2008; Mills, Gale,  
Patterson, Engelhardt, Eriksen, & Apostolov, 2008; Han, 
Grinstein-Weiss, & Sherraden, 2009). The program had a 
positive, statistically significant impact on homeowner-
ship rates after  five years. Among households who  
rented at baseline, homeownership rates between 1998 
and 2003 rose by 7 to 11 percentage points for treatment 
group members relative to control group members. The 
program’s impacts on net worth and on qualified asset 
building uses were not consistent.  
 
Using ADD Waves 1–3 data, Engelhardt, Eriksen, Gale, & 
Mills (2010) estimate impacts of homeownership for low-
income households on a wide variety of social outcomes, 
including political involvement, neighborhood involve-
ment, and assistance given to others. They find zero or 
negative effects on measures of political involvement. 
Results for other social outcomes were not statistically 
significant. 
 
Evidence gathered from extended personal interviews 
with 84 experiment participants (59 treatment, 25 control) 
suggest positive psychological, cognitive, behavioral, and 
economic effects. In addition, some IDA participants with 
children reported feeling reassured that their savings 
would benefit their children by paying for their children’s 
education, improving their living environment, or  
generally providing for their children’s future (Sherraden, 
McBride, Hanson, & Johnson, 2005; Sherraden & 
McBride, 2010). 
Table 1.3  
Program Use by Reasons for Saving Among Treatment Group Members Present at Wave 4 with Opened Accounts (N=368) 
Reason for saving 
Share of treatment 
group 
Average gross 
deposits ($) 
Average monthly net 
deposit ($) 
Deposit  
frequency 
Probability of any 
matched withdrawal 
Home purchase 0.46 1,402 9 0.46 0.18 
Home repair 0.21 2,278 39 0.73 0.79 
Education 0.08 2,330 29 0.66 0.71 
Retirement Saving 0.2 2,384 32 0.69 0.71 
Small business 0.06 1,526 21 0.49 0.48 
Total sample 1 1,855 22 0.58 0.47 
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The Need for Long-Term Analysis 
The research discussed in the previous section focuses on 
outcomes over the first 4 years of the ADD program and 
can be described as short-term impacts. Participants had 
up to 3 years to save in their IDAs, and then they had  
another 6 months to use their funds for matched  
purposes. The ADD program ended at Wave 3. However, 
post-participation analysis is important for understanding 
the longer-term impacts after the IDA program ended. 
 
There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the long-
term effects because, prior to ADD4, there was no  
experimental study on the long-term impacts of IDAs 
and, indeed, very little long-term experimental evidence 
regarding saving policies in general. Analysis of other 
(non-saving) policies has shown that long-term effects 
can be stronger or weaker than short-term effects.
5
  
 
Impacts of asset building on individuals may not be  
immediate. To the extent that asset building produces 
changes in behavior or attitudes, the effects may take 
time to manifest. Indeed, the difference between dynamic 
impacts that take place over time and static impacts that 
are measured at one point in time is one of the key  
differences in underlying philosophy between the  
asset-building approach and the conventional,  
welfare-based approach to social policy. For example, 
saving for a down payment may require more than three 
years, especially for low-income households. People 
might initially use the IDA to invest in education, in which 
case their homeownership rates and financial wealth may 
not be affected until much later. Starting a business may 
yield higher or lower returns during the start-up period 
relative to a longer period of time. As a result, measuring 
long-term performance is important in understanding the 
true impacts of participation in an IDA program.  
 
The incentives built into the Tulsa IDA experiment  
suggest one reason why the long-term effects may be 
smaller than the short-term effects. Specifically, treatment 
group members had incentives to purchase homes before 
the end of 2003 (in order to receive a 2:1 match) while 
control group members had incentives to delay home 
purchases until 2004 (when they would become eligible 
once again for a variety of CAPTC home-buyer assistance 
programs). On the other hand, financial education and 
the impact of the very act of saving and owning wealth 
(as posited by Sherraden 1991) might spur members of 
the treatment group to maintain or increase gains after 
the program ended in 2003. 
 
ADD4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Propelled by the need for evidence of the long-term  
impacts of IDAs, we designed and implemented the ADD4 
study. Our investigation was guided by two overarching 
research questions:
6
   
 
1.  What are the long-term effects of access to a  
3-year IDA program on targeted asset building and 
overall wealth among low-income families? 
 
Specifically, we address the following questions by 
comparing changes in a variety of outcome variables 
between treatment and control members over a  
ten-year period. 
 
 Does net worth increase?  
 Do rates of homeownership rise (among those who did 
not own homes at baseline)? 
 Do rates of business ownership rise and does the value 
of business equity rise?  
 Does educational attainment increase?  
 Does the likelihood of having a retirement savings  
account rise and do retirement saving balances rise?  
 Among those who owned homes at baseline, is the 
likelihood of undertaking home improvement greater? 
 
2.  What are the long-term psychological and health 
effects of access to a 3-year IDA program? 
 
We test whether in the Wave 4 survey, relative to  
control group members, treatment group members:  
 
 Score higher on a measure of future orientation? 
 Express higher life satisfaction? 
 Score lower on a measure of depression? 
 Report better health outcomes? 
 Report less alcohol and tobacco use? 
5. See Almond & Currie (2010) for a discussion and review of long-term impacts of early childhood interventions and Chetty et al. (2010) for a re-
cent contribution to that literature. 
6. The ADD4 study also includes a cost-benefit analysis of the Tulsa IDA program, presented in a separate report and giving particular attention to 
capturing both the economic impacts and the social-psychological effects of the program.  
Chapter 2 
American Dream Demonstration Wave 4 
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Three Waves of Previously Collected Data 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the earlier data in the Tulsa 
IDA experiment were collected in three waves from 1998 
to 2003. Because three waves of data had already been 
collected from this group, it is important to explain the 
basic design of earlier surveys before discussing the ADD 
Wave 4 survey.  
 
The surveys covered a wide range of questions relating to 
individuals’ employment, assets, debt, family structure, 
education, and related issues. Besides basic demographic 
information, the questions also focused on financial  
stability and financial knowledge. Several questions  
inquired about the participants’ expectations for and  
behavior toward their children. In addition, the surveys 
included a few questions about life satisfaction and future 
orientation.  
 
In the studies mentioned earlier, looking at the outcomes 
from Waves 1 to 3, the data from the surveys were  
supplemented with administrative data from the  
Management Information System for Individual  
Development Accounts (MIS IDA). MIS IDA tracked  
program characteristics, participant characteristics (both 
sociodemographic and financial), and saving transactions 
of IDA participants (beyond net savings amount). MIS IDA 
electronically imported account information from  
financial institutions, and thus provides highly accurate 
data on all IDA account transactions of all ADD  
participants.  
 
This may be the best available dataset on savings  
patterns among low-income families (Schreiner et al., 
2002). CSD designed and created MIS IDA as a research 
tool for the ADD, collected the MIS IDA data, and merged 
these data with the survey data. Merging this data with 
the ADD Wave 4 data is important for various analyses 
such as examining saving performance during the  
program and outcomes 6 years after program  
completion. 
 
The ADD Wave 4 Survey7  
The ADD fourth wave of data collection started in August 
2008, about 10 years after random assignment, and about 
6 years after the IDA program ended. The potential  
sample for Wave 4 was 1,068 respondents. No differential 
efforts were used to track down treatment versus control 
group members, nor were any information sets used if 
they predominantly identified only treatment or control 
group members. We imposed these constraints to ensure 
that we did not collect a sample of study participants that 
was biased with respect to the treatment. Further,  
interviews were conducted at an even pace for both the 
treatment and control groups, which was important to 
avoid bias due to the economic downturn that developed 
and worsened during the period of data collection.  
 
Data collection lasted about 8 months and ended in 
March 2009. The interviews were primarily conducted  
in-person for participants living in greater Tulsa; the 17% 
of respondents who lived elsewhere were interviewed by 
telephone.  
 
After much consideration, we changed the primary survey 
method from chiefly telephone interviews (Waves 1 to 3) 
to primarily personal interviews at Wave 4. This was done 
for several reasons. First, research suggests that response 
rates tend to be higher for personal interviews than they 
are for telephone interviews. Second, in-person  
respondents give more attention to interviewers, which 
typically yields more complete data. The presence of the 
interviewer allows for response to non-verbal cues and 
allows the interviewer to address respondents’ uncertainty 
about answers, and generally reduces item non-response. 
Third, questions related to income, debts, and property 
ownership, which comprise a significant portion of the 
Wave 4 survey, are among the most sensitive survey  
topics. Interviewing respondents face-to-face is likely to 
make respondents feel more comfortable and forth-
coming with financial data (Biemer, Groves, Lyberg, 
Mathiowetz, & Sudman, 1991). In addition, a field  
7.  Some text in this section and in Chapter 3 also appear in manuscripts detailing the ADD4 findings on particular outcomes.  
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interviewer may be better equipped to clarify confusing 
items or terms related to financial questions. Finally, given 
the expected length for survey completion (60 minutes), 
an in-person interviewer is better equipped to deal with 
respondent fatigue or lagging motivation as the interview 
proceeds.  
 
Wave 4 questions retained the format and content of 
questions employed in the earlier surveys. Unlike other 
waves, however, the Wave 4 survey also asked retro-
spective questions about homeownership history in  
addition to current economic, financial, demographic, 
community, and health status. Respondents were asked 
to report on their homeownership history starting in 
1998: What was their status at that time? When did they 
buy a house? When did they sell it? When did they buy 
another house? When did they sell that house, etc.?  
Using this information, we constructed a homeownership 
history for each respondent from 1998 to 2009. 
 15 
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Wave 4 Response Rate and Attrition 
At Wave 4, 10 years after random assignment and 6 years 
after the end of the intervention, 855 participants were 
located and surveyed (80.1% of living members of the 
baseline sample). The Wave 4 sample included 146  
respondents who were not interviewed at Wave 3 and 48 
respondents who had not been interviewed since  
baseline. Response rates for each wave are shown in  
Table 3.1. 
 
 
As shown on Table 3.2, when those who responded at 
Wave 4 are compared on baseline interview characteris-
tics to those who did not, we find that Wave 4 respond-
ents were more likely to be female, white, unmarried,  
and a homeowner. Wave 4 respondents were also more 
likely to have been in the top assets category (assets 
equaling at least 3 months of sample mean income 
worth) and less likely to have been in the lowest assets 
category at baseline. Respondents and attriters were  
statistically the same with respect to bank account  
ownership, children, welfare receipt, education, debt  
levels, age, and monthly household income.  
 
Panel Imbalance 
The American Dream Demonstration is one of two IDA 
research projects that used a randomized controlled  
research design, which makes the study a true  
experimental test of the impact of IDA program  
participation, by enabling a comparison between two 
similar groups whose only difference is their treatment 
group assignment. Random assignment, however, may  
 
 
Table 3.2  
Baseline Characteristics of Attriters and Wave 4  
Respondents 
  Attrite Respond Diff p 
  
Mean/  
prptn 
Mean/    
prptn 
T-C  
Total household income 
(monthly) 
1,418 1,422 -4.19 0.94 
Female 0.73 0.8 -0.07 0.02 
Age 35.56 35.9 -0.34 0.65 
Bank account ownership 0.81 0.85 -0.04 0.19 
Married 0.32 0.27 0.06 0.08 
Homeowner 0.15 0.24 -0.09 0.00 
Children in home 0.78 0.77 0.01 0.78 
Welfare recipient 0.31 0.26 0.04 0.17 
Race         
Caucasian 0.38 0.46 -0.08 0.02 
African American 0.47 0.41 0.06 0.11 
Education         
HS degree or less 0.38 0.33 0.05 0.16 
Some college 0.4 0.41 -0.01 0.78 
College graduate 0.22 0.26 -0.04 0.22 
Assets         
Less than 1 month 0.29 0.22 0.07 0.03 
1-2 months of assets 0.1 0.11 0 0.86 
2-3 months of assets 0.09 0.09 0 0.92 
3+months of assets 0.38 0.45 -0.06 0.07 
Missing on assets 0.14 0.14 0 0.99 
Debts         
Less than 1 month 0.24 0.2 0.04 0.19 
1-2 months of debts 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.62 
2-3 months of debts 0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.15 
3+months of debts 0.47 0.48 -0.01 0.77 
Missing on debts 0.19 0.18 0 0.87 
N 248 855  
Note: The asset and debt categories refer to the value of respondents’ 
assets and debts relative to the sample mean monthly income. 
Chapter 3 
Methodology 
Table 3.1 
Sample Size by Treatment Status and Survey Wave 
  Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 
  n % n % n % n % 
Control 566 100 472 83.4 428 75.6 448 81.5 
Treatment 537 100 461 85.8 412 76.7 407 78.6 
Full sample 1103 100 933 84.6 840 76.2 855 80.1 
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not result in completely equivalent treatment groups.  
In addition, due to differential attrition, treatment groups 
which are equivalent at baseline may become unbalanced 
in later waves. For these reasons, it is necessary to  
measure important variables at assignment, and to  
compare groups on these measures to verify that random 
assignment fully controlled for differences between the 
two groups. In this section we assess the extent of panel 
imbalance in the ADD study sample. We compare groups 
among respondents present at baseline, Wave 3 and 
Wave 4 (see Table 3.3). 
 
Based on measures taken at baseline (n=1,103 for most 
measures), randomization resulted in only a few  
significant or marginally significant differences between 
treatment and control groups. There is some evidence 
that the control group was better off financially at  
baseline. The control group had significantly more assets 
at baseline than the treatment group (p<0.05), and was 
more likely to have assets equivalent to 3 or more 
months of income (p<0.05). The control group was also 
significantly more likely to own a home at baseline 
(p<0.05). In contrast, the treatment group was more likely 
to say that their financial situation had worsened during 
the previous year (p<0.05). On the other hand, the  
control group had slightly higher scores on a scale  
measure of financial strain (p<0.10).  
 
As the study progressed, the composition of the sample 
shifted at each data collection wave due to attrition.  
At Wave 3 (n=840 for most measures), the treatment 
group was still more likely to have had a baseline  
monthly income above $3,000 (p<0.10). The control 
group was also still more likely to have had assets at 
baseline worth more than 3 months of income (p<0.10), 
although the difference between the two groups with 
regard to absolute value of baseline assets was no longer 
significant. The treatment group as it appeared at Wave 3 
was also more likely to have a checking or savings  
account at baseline (p <0.05). At Wave 3, there was no 
longer a difference between the two groups with regard 
to home ownership, although the treatment group was 
more likely to have owned property at baseline (p<0.05). 
Conflicting differences regarding baseline financial  
hardship remain in the study sample at Wave 3: the  
treatment group was more likely to report a worsening 
financial situation at baseline (p<0.05), while the control 
group scored higher on a scale measure of financial strain 
(p<0.10). 
 
At Wave 4, the study survey recovered 146 respondents 
who had been missing at Wave 3. Surprisingly, the study 
sample composition at Wave 4 (n=855) is more balanced 
with regard to baseline characteristics than it is at either 
random assignment or Wave 3. However, there is still 
some evidence that the control group was at a greater 
financial advantage at baseline; they were more likely to 
have assets equivalent to 3 or more months of income 
(p<0.05), while the treatment group was more likely to 
have fewer assets at baseline (p<0.05). 
 
Item Nonresponse 
Among the 855 Wave 4 respondents, not every  
respondent was asked every question and not every  
respondent gave valid answers to every question they 
were asked. The former, caused by skip patterns in the 
survey instrument and, most often, the non-applicability 
of the question to a given respondent (e.g. those who 
never owned a home are not asked about home repair 
and improvement), does not compromise inference. 
When this arises in outcome variables, we analyze those 
cases with valid, non-missing data. 
 
The second type of missing data, caused by the  
respondent being unwilling or unable to provide a  
response, can affect the analysis and interpretation of 
study results. In survey research, it is often the case that 
these missing values are related to the true but  
unreported value of the variable being measured. That is 
to say, those with item nonresponse may systematically 
differ from respondents. 
 
Across the baseline and Wave 4 data, item nonresponse 
rates are most often under 5% of the question-eligible 
survey sample for each survey item. On sensitive variables 
such as income, nonresponse rates are between 5% and 
10%. For the baseline characteristics used as covariance 
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Table 3.3 
Panel Imbalance on Baseline Characteristics Among Respondents from Different Waves 
  Baseline sample Wave-3 sample Wave-4 sample 
  Treat Cont Diff p Treat Cont Diff p Treat Cont Diff p 
  
mean/ 
prptn 
mean/ 
prptn 
T-C 2-tail 
mean/ 
prpt 
mean/ 
prptn 
T-C 2-tail 
mean/ 
prptn 
mean/ 
prptn 
T-C 2-tail 
Female 0.78 0.79 -0.01 0.755 0.79 0.81 -0.02 0.479 0.79 0.81 -0.02 0.656 
Married 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.950 0.28 0.24 0.04 0.204 0.27 0.26 0.01 0.884 
Banked 0.86 0.82 0.04 0.121 0.89 0.83 0.06 0.014 0.86 0.83 0.03 0.139 
Age             
Less than 25 0.15 0.12 0.03 0.135 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.522 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.289 
25-35 0.35 0.37 -0.02 0.328 0.33 0.36 -0.03 0.418 0.34 0.37 -0.03 0.455 
35-45 0.33 0.29 0.04 0.171 0.35 0.30 0.05 0.113 0.32 0.29 0.03 0.481 
45-55 0.13 0.16 -0.03 0.093 0.14 0.17 -0.03 0.202 0.14 0.16 -0.02 0.451 
55+ 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.709 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.618 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.770 
Income             
$1,000-$2,000 0.71 0.72 -0.01 0.625 0.73 0.72 0.01 0.782 0.71 0.72 -0.01 0.897 
$2,000-$3,000 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.635 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.918 0.18 0.17 0.01 0.583 
$3,000+ 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.091 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.069 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.120 
Income Missing 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.865 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.204 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.468 
Race             
White 0.43 0.45 -0.02 0.496 0.45 0.49 -0.04 0.227 0.44 0.47 -0.03 0.364 
Black 0.43 0.41 0.02 0.455 0.43 0.39 0.04 0.245 0.43 0.39 0.04 0.243 
Other 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.928 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.922 0.13 0.14 -0.01 0.717 
Assets             
Less than 1 month 0.25 0.22 0.03 0.362 0.21 0.22 -0.01 0.832 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.996 
1-2 months 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.430 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.761 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.298 
2-3 months 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.875 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.770 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.850 
3+ months 0.40 0.46 -0.06 0.036 0.42 0.48 -0.06 0.073 0.41 0.48 -0.07 0.041 
Assets Missing 0.15 0.12 0.03 0.190 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.020 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.064 
Liabilities             
Less than 1 month 0.21 0.22 -0.01 0.777 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.878 0.20 0.21 -0.01 0.756 
1-2 months 0.07 0.08 -0.01 0.565 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.903 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.998 
2-3 months 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.394 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.359 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.834 
3+ months 0.47 0.48 -0.01 0.579 0.49 0.51 -0.02 0.628 0.47 0.48 -0.01 0.816 
Liabilities Missing 0.21 0.16 0.05 0.059 0.19 0.16 0.03 0.151 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.623 
Unsubsidized Housing 0.74 0.75 -0.01 0.537 0.76 0.76 0.00 0.880 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.959 
Health Insurance 0.59 0.57 0.02 0.512 0.59 0.58 0.01 0.688 0.59 0.58 0.01 0.587 
Own computer 0.28 0.25 0.03 0.308 0.31 0.27 0.04 0.206 0.29 0.27 0.02 0.425 
Own dishwasher 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.958 0.23 0.24 -0.01 0.919 0.23 0.23 0.00 0.965 
Own washer 0.53 0.50 0.03 0.304 0.57 0.56 0.01 0.625 0.55 0.52 0.03 0.411 
Own dryer 0.52 0.51 0.01 0.727 0.56 0.56 0.00 0.886 0.53 0.52 0.01 0.857 
Own refrigerator 0.48 0.51 -0.03 0.427 0.52 0.56 -0.04 0.170 0.50 0.54 -0.04 0.368 
Own freezer 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.842 0.17 0.16 0.01 0.600 0.17 0.15 0.02 0.427 
Own air conditioning 0.18 0.19 -0.01 0.409 0.20 0.21 -0.01 0.748 0.19 0.20 -0.01 0.789 
Own sewing machine 0.22 0.25 -0.03 0.151 0.26 0.29 -0.03 0.259 0.23 0.27 -0.04 0.192 
Own car 0.81 0.83 -0.02 0.300 0.84 0.84 0.00 0.965 0.84 0.85 -0.01 0.755 
Own home 0.19 0.24 -0.05 0.037 0.23 0.24 -0.01 0.568 0.21 0.26 -0.05 0.106 
Own property 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.416 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.043 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.248 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
Panel Imbalance on Baseline Characteristics Among Respondents from Different Waves 
  Baseline sample Wave-3 sample Wave-4 sample 
  Treat Cont Diff p Treat Cont Diff p Treat Cont Diff p 
  
mean/ 
prptn 
mean/ 
prptn 
T-C 2-tail 
mean/ 
prpt 
mean/ 
prptn 
T-C 2-tail 
mean/ 
prptn 
mean/ 
prptn 
T-C 2-tail 
IRA account 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.207 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.207 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.358 
Satisfied with general health (y/n) 0.85 0.87 -0.02 0.431 0.87 0.86 0.01 0.562 0.86 0.86 0.00 0.973 
Satisfied with financial situation  
(y/n) 
0.63 0.60 0.03 0.274 0.63 0.58 0.05 0.164 0.63 0.60 0.03 0.315 
Financial situation worse  (y/n) 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.012 0.18 0.13 0.05 0.020 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.021 
No of other adults in HH 0.51 0.53 -0.02 0.611 0.49 0.51 -0.02 0.655 0.47 0.52 -0.05 0.308 
No of children in HH 1.74 1.65 0.09 0.277 1.75 1.62 0.13 0.149 1.72 1.62 0.10 0.250 
Total assets 14378 18881 -4503 0.014 16677 18729 -2053 0.33 16126 19386 -3260 0.128 
Total liabilities 12631 14334 -1702 0.179 13589 14753 -1164 0.42 12995 14690 -1695 0.245 
Ownership scale 2.57 2.58 -0.01 0.943 2.82 2.85 -0.03 0.845 2.70 2.70 0.00 0.992 
Financial strain scale 0.55 0.58 -0.03 0.076 0.55 0.58 -0.03 0.078 0.56 0.57 -0.01 0.516 
Giving help in community scale 0.56 0.54 0.02 0.330 0.56 0.54 0.02 0.263 0.56 0.54 0.02 0.172 
Getting help from community 
scale 
0.35 0.35 0.00 0.854 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.652 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.955 
Community involvement scale 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.817 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.852 0.39 0.40 -0.01 0.546 
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control variables in the models discussed in this report, 
65 respondents (7.6%) are missing on at least one  
variable and are thus excluded in models that use listwise 
deletion. 
 
The notable exception to the low rates of item non-
response is found in the variables that sum to net worth. 
Net worth is composed of 33 individual asset and debt 
measures and 44% of respondents are missing at least 
one of these, and are thus missing on the net worth  
variable. This high rate of nonresponse is driven by two 
measures: car value and non-housing property value, 
which were initially omitted from the Wave 4 survey 
and—after a supplemental survey to cover these  
questions—still are missing for 27% and 21% of  
respondents, respectively. For analyses of the wealth,  
assets, and debt outcomes, we supplemented listwise 
deleted data with imputed data as discussed below. 
 
Analysis Plan and Methods  
The ADD4 data were collected to estimate the long-term 
effect of assignment to eligibility for the CAPTC IDA  
program on various financial and nonfinancial outcomes. 
The outcomes of interest are those related to the  
behaviors subsidized by the IDA program (e.g. saving, 
home purchase, etc.) as well as the potential impacts of 
those behaviors on assets, health, and other social and 
economic variables. In this report, we detail basic  
investigation into the effect of treatment assignment on 
these outcomes. Each outcome will be explored and  
reported in more detail in future publications. 
 
The ADD experiment randomly assigned study  
participants to the treatment and control groups, thus 
there should be no systematic difference between these 
groups. In principle then, the long-term impact of the 
Tulsa IDA program could be estimated as the simple  
difference between treatment and control on each  
outcome. In the results section below, we include  
estimates of these differences for outcomes of interest. 
Similarly, in the program evaluation literature, difference 
in differences (DiD) analysis is often used when pre- and 
post-test measures are available on outcomes, as they are 
for many ADD outcomes. In experimental data, DiD may 
account for baseline differences in composition between 
groups, though not when baseline imbalance interacts 
with the treatment effect, as is shown and discussed  
below. 
 
To supplement bivariate and DiD estimates and to  
improve the precision of the estimate of the treatment 
effect, we also employ regression analyses to examine the 
relationship between treatment assignment and the  
outcome. In these analyses, we control for selected  
baseline characteristics in the regression analysis.  
For most continuous outcomes, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression is used. Logistic or probit regressions 
were used for dichotomous outcomes, and Poisson  
regressions were used for count outcomes. In all analyses, 
an alpha of 0.100 was accepted as the threshold for  
identifying significant differences and impacts. Unless 
otherwise indicated, 2-tail tests of significance are used 
throughout the report. All regressions take the form: 
  
W4=a+ bT+cW1+dX+e 
 
where W4 is the outcome variable at time 4, a is a  
coefficient on a constant, here taken to be one, bT is the 
treatment condition and its coefficient, cW1 is the Wave 1 
value for the outcome variable and its coefficient, when 
available, dX is a vector of control variables,
8
  measured at 
baseline, and e is the error term. 
 
Corrective steps were taken when influential, outlying  
cases biased point estimates of the average treatment 
effect. These outlying cases harm the precision of the 
point estimate of the treatment effect and inflate  
standard errors. For some outcomes, we used robust  
regressions, wherein outlying observations are  
8.  Regression models control for age, income, sex, education, bank account ownership, race, marital status, interview cohort, total assets, total debt, 
number of adults in the household, presence of children in the household, receipt of housing subsidy, health insurance, business ownership, non-
housing property ownership, presence of retirement savings, car ownership, welfare receipt, ownership of big-ticket household goods, financial 
strain, community integration and involvement, health, and financial satisfaction, all measured at baseline. These covariates capture the main demo-
graphic and economic conditions at baseline that may influence the trajectory of respondents with respect to the outcomes. 
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down-weighted. For other outcomes, particularly those 
with a threshold connected to the common understand-
ing of the mechanism or phenomenon, we used  
winsorizing. In winsorizing, extreme high and low values 
are recoded to a threshold value. Thus, the direction and 
valence of the case is maintained, but its leverage is  
reduced. When outcome variables were winsorized,  
sensitivity analyses with different threshold criteria were 
performed. 
 
In some instances, in spite of random assignment,  
baseline sample imbalance existed between the  
treatment and control groups, which threatened the  
reliability of inference. For outcomes with evidence of this 
problem, in addition to covariance control in regression, 
we also fit models with propensity score weights.  
Propensity score weights account for unequal allocation 
to treatment, conditional on observed characteristics.  
After weighting, the treatment and control groups are 
equivalent on observed covariates. However, while  
propensity score weighting can control for observed  
differences, there could still be unmeasured differences in 
level of economic functioning that we are unable to  
control for. 
 
For some of the outcomes, there were strong theoretical 
reasons to suspect that treatment may differentially affect 
specific sub-groups in the population, defined by  
exogenous baseline characteristics. When this was the 
case, the interaction of the characteristic with treatment 
was investigated using either sub-group analysis or the 
inclusion of interaction terms in regression models.  
Sub-group analyses were also performed and reported 
when a specific baseline population was thought to  
experience the effect of treatment in a different way from 
the sample at large, with respect to an outcome under 
investigation. 
The specific analytic approaches used for each outcome 
reported below are reported when the outcome is  
discussed. Each analysis uses the available analytic  
sample, using listwise deletion to remove cases with  
item-missing data. The exception is the analysis of net 
worth, assets and debts. Because of a higher-than-usual 
percentage of item-missing data, five implicates were 
created using multiple imputation through chained  
equations and used for the analysis. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
Internal Validity (Crossovers and Contamination) 
The internal validity of the experiment depends on how 
well it was implemented. We discuss two countervailing 
concerns: crossovers and other services. Each issue  
applies only to the period through 2003, rather than the 
entire study period through 2009.  
 
For the first issue, a formal definition of a crossover is a 
control group member who, during the 1998 to 2003  
period, received some part of the treatment—that is, 
opened an IDA or attended financial-education classes 
reserved for treatment. Crossovers could also be defined 
more expansively as control group members who, during 
the experimental period, received access to CAPTC’s 
homebuyer-assistance programs (other than the IDA) or 
who were able to open an IDA at some other non-CAPTC 
location.  
 
Orr (1999) developed an intent-to-treat estimate adjusted 
for crossovers, ITTo, that is calculated as ITTo-= ITT/(1–c) 
where ITT is the intent-to-treat estimate, c is the  
proportion of the control group represented by  
crossovers, and where it is assumed that all treatment 
group members participate in the treatment.
9
 This  
9.  In the IDA experiment, crossovers are probably not a representative sample of controls; they are probably more highly motivated to save and so 
would have done better than the typical control even in the absence of crossover. As a result, dropping crossovers from the sample would under-
mine the balance between treatments and controls that is the purpose and chief benefit of random assignment.  
10. The adjusted effect, ITTo = p(TOT) + (1-p)0 – c(TOT) - (1-c)0. Collecting terms and noting that ITT = TOT/p yields the equation in the text. The for-
mula in the text collapses to the formula given by Orr when p=1. Both formulas are actually upper bounds on the adjustment for crossovers, since 
they assume that each crossover household received the full treatment. This assumption seems like an overstatement both because even those 
controls who opened an IDA are unlikely to have received all of the financial education and case management that treatment group members did 
and because (as discussed in the text below) more than half of those respondents we are counting as crossovers did not open an IDA.  
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adjustment alters the magnitude of the estimated  
treatment effect, but does not alter its statistical  
significance. We generalize this formula to allow for less 
than 100% participation by members of the treatment 
group (p<1) in IDAs, in which case the resulting  
adjustment is ITTo-= ITT*p/(p-c).
10
 
 
The data show 21 control group members who reported 
participating in an IDA program during the experimental 
period and an additional 27 who reported participating in 
CAPTC’s down payment assistance program, which was 
off-limits to both control and treatment group members 
under the experiment protocol. Even if all 48 members 
were considered crossovers, c is small (0.107 = 48/448), 
and the adjusted impact estimates are only slightly larger 
than the ITT estimates.
11
  
 
Table 3.4  
Use of CAPTC Services During the Experimental Period 
  N Treat Cont Diff p 
Social programs 807 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.10 
Workforce programs 807 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.39 
Medical services 806 0.12 0.13 -0.01 0.83 
Youth programs 806 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.08 
Small business pro-
grams 807 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.00 
Home buying programs 806 0.23 0.07 0.17 0.00 
Education services 807 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.68 
Tax preparation services 807 0.46 0.38 0.08 0.02 
 
A second issue works in the opposite direction from the 
crossover effect. As shown in Table 3.4, treatments were 
generally more likely than controls to use permitted  
non-IDA social services at CAPTC—especially  
tax-preparation services. In addition, although 27 control 
group members used home buying assistance services 
for which they were not eligible, 90 treatment group 
members used such services. It is not clear whether this is 
an outcome of the IDA program, part of the IDA  
treatment itself, or merely represents treatment group 
members misreporting permitted IDA-related  
home-buyer education as being part of another CAPTC 
program. The main point, though, is that treatment and 
control groups received different sets of benefits from  
CAPTC. 
 
External Validity (Self-Selection and Motivation) 
Efforts to generalize the results for the Tulsa IDA  
experiment should account for five considerations. The 
first is the condition of housing markets in the United 
States during the study period. Between 1998 and 2007  
it was relatively easy to buy a home in the U.S. During 
that time, favorable demographics, strong economic  
conditions, innovations in mortgage markets—
particularly sub-prime lending—and public policies and 
programs supporting homeownership all worked to  
increase the homeownership rate in aggregate and 
among low-income households in particular (Bostic & 
Lee, 2008; Herbert & Belsky, 2008). The general condition 
of United States housing markets during this period  
certainly contributed to the large increase in  
homeownership rates we find in both the treatment and 
control groups. In a housing market where obtaining 
loans is more difficult, IDA program participation may 
have a stronger impact on home purchase. 
 
 
 
11. As an example of the magnitude of the effect, a 2 percentage point ITT effect would imply a 2.27 percentage point adjusted effect when c = .107 
and p(IDA participation) = .90.  
12. The median home value in Tulsa County (adjusted to 2008 dollars) was $99,332 in 1990, $111,481 in 2001, and $124,607 in 2007 (Ard, O & Puckett, 
D., 2002; American Community Survey 2007). In 2009, the median home price to income ratio for Tulsa County was 2.8, compared to 6.2 for the 
nation (National Association of Realtors 2009).  
13. Other evidence that may be indicative of the availability of homebuyer assistance programs in Tulsa is the fact that about 90% of both treatment 
and control group members with mortgages held fixed-rate mortgages, during a period of heavy sub-prime lending when mortgages increasingly 
featured adjustable rates.  
 
 
Note: The sample for this table includes Wave 4 respondents who 
were also in either Wave 2 or Wave 3.  
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A second issue is the housing market in Tulsa. Housing 
costs in the Tulsa area were substantially below national 
averages during the experiment, making homeownership 
even more affordable for low-income people.
12
  
 
A third issue is the availability of other local home-
ownership assistance. Tulsa seems to have had several 
affordable-housing programs during the study period, 
which offered financial assistance. For example, Housing 
Partners of Tulsa offered down-payment and closing-cost 
assistance equal to 5% of the purchase price upon  
completion of a home buyer education program (Tulsa 
Housing Authority 2008). No matched savings were  
required to receive those funds.
13    
IDA programs in areas 
that do not have other effective and competing home-
buyer assistance programs may have stronger impacts. 
 
A fourth issue has to do with program design. The Tulsa 
IDA program was among the first programs in the  
country when it started in 1998. Based on field  
experience, many current IDA programs are structured 
differently in terms of match rates, maximum available 
matches, duration, qualified uses of the funds, and so on. 
For example, most of the IDA programs today, funded 
through the federal AFI program, offer savings period of 
up to 5 years rather than the 3-year period of the Tulsa 
program (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
2010). Alternative program designs may result in different 
program impacts.  
 
Fifth, although the sample in Tulsa may well be a  
representative subsample of the population most  
interested in IDAs, it was not a representative sample of 
all qualified households.  Mills, Gale, et al. (2008) find 
substantial differences between Tulsa IDA respondents 
and IDA-eligible samples drawn from the 1998 Survey of 
Consumer Finances and from 2000 Census data for the 
greater Tulsa area. Study participants were more  
educated, and are more likely to be single, female, and 
black than the comparison samples of IDA-eligible 
households. The impact of IDA program participation on 
a more representative sample of eligible participants may 
vary from those reported here, although our subgroup 
analysis suggests that, other than income, there were no 
statistically significant differences within subgroups.  
 
To provide additional evidence on this, we drew a sample 
from the 1999 Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
Table 3.5  
Change in Homeownership Rates: IDA Control Group Sample Versus IDA-Eligible PSID Sample 
  
Tulsa IDA  IDA-eligible  
Difference p 
control group PSID sample 
Whole Sample         
Homeownership in Wave 1 (1999) 0.24 0.3 -0.06 0.04 
Homeownership in Wave 4 (2007) 0.53 0.43 0.1 0.00 
Difference 0.29 0.14 0.16 0.00 
Owners in Wave 1 (1999)         
Homeownership in Wave 1/1999 1 1 0 - 
Homeownership in Wave 4/2007 0.79 0.84 -0.05 0.28 
Difference -0.21 -0.16 -0.05 0.28 
Renters in Wave 1 (1999)         
Homeownership in Wave 1/1999 0 0 0 - 
Homeownership in Wave 4/2007 0.45 0.26 0.19 0.00 
Difference 0.45 0.26 0.19 0.00 
14. One potential concern with this comparison is that even after selecting for IDA eligibility in 1999, the PSID sample was substantially different from 
the ADD sample on demographic and financial characteristics. In sensitivity analysis, we reweighted the samples using propensity score radius 
matching and the basic finding did not change.  
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based on the eligibility rules for the Tulsa IDA. The time 
elapsed between the 1999 and 2007 waves of the PSID is 
roughly comparable to the period between the Wave 1 
and Wave 4 surveys described above. Table 3.5 shows 
substantial differences in the increase in homeownership 
between the PSID sample and the Tulsa control group.  
In the PSID sample, the homeownership rate rose by 14  
percentage points, from 30% in 1999 to 43% in 2007.  
In contrast, among Tulsa control group members, the 
homeownership rate rose by 29 percentage points, from 
24% in 1998-99 to 53% by 2009. Among renters in the 
initial period, the increase in homeownership rates was  
19 percentage points higher in the Tulsa control group 
than in the PSID subsample. All of these differences are 
highly significant.
14
 These results may suggest that  
controls in the CAPTC experiment either were more  
motivated to purchase homes or faced more favorable 
housing market and housing assistance conditions than 
the general US population with similar observed  
characteristics. This also demonstrates the importance of 
using a randomized evaluation to study the impacts of 
IDAs, rather than drawing on a nonrandomized sample of 
observationally equivalent households that did not  
self-select into an IDA experiment.  
 
Measurement Error 
A universal concern in survey-based research is the  
potential deviation of given responses from the true  
value. Misunderstanding of the question, data entry  
errors, recall errors, and biases such as social desirability 
bias can all introduce errors in measurement.  
 
Furthermore, due to self-reporting, the data may not be a 
precise measure. The CAPI and CATI systems used in data 
collection included automatic range check prompts and 
follow-up verification by interviewers. Though the  
instruments and interview modes of ADD took steps to 
minimize measurement error, it could still persist in the 
data. There is no reason to believe, however, that  
measurement error would correlate with treatment  
assignment. Nevertheless, measurement error, even when 
random, has the effect of creating noise and damping 
effects that might exist. 
Minimal Detectable Effects 
The small sample size reduces power and makes it  
challenging to find statistically significant differences, 
even when effect sizes are meaningful. To illustrate this 
challenge, we calculate the minimum detectable effects 
for major impacts, including net worth, homeownership, 
education, and business outcomes, presented in Table 
3.6. 
 25 
  
 
Table 3.6 
Minimal Detectable Effects for Major Outcomes 
  
Control proportion/ 
mean (SD) 
Point estimate Power 
MDE (power=.80,  
alpha=.10) 
Homeownership 0.52 .03 .19 .09 
Duration of homeownership 6.43 (2.95) .18 .23 .52 
Appreciation rate 3,154 (7,018) 1,280 .50 1,921 
Winsorized appreciation rate 2,933 (5,294) 735 .35 1,447 
Rate of return per year of ownership .12 (23) 26 1.0 6.3 
Expense amount 6,350 (9,577) -532 .15 -2,400 
Winsorized expense amount 4,026 (4,066) -325 .20 -1,026 
Amount needed 11,691 (11,700) -1,796 .27 -4,341 
Winsorized amount needed 8,566 (5,061) -2,091 .87 -1,866 
Any repairs 0.68 0.00 n/a .12 
Any forgone repairs 0.47 -0.03 .12 -.13 
Increase in education 0.34 0.04 .22 .11 
New some college 0.28 0.11 .55 .15 
New college degree 0.21 -0.01 .08 .09 
Enroll in class 0.46 0.06 .50 .09 
New degree 0.31 0.04 .31 .09 
Business equity 4,501 (43,102) -169 .10 7,749 
Winsorized business equity 681 (2,328) -53 .12 419 
Business ownership 0.14 -0.02 .18 .07 
Any dedicated retirement savings 0.47 0.02 .12 .10 
Mean value of retirement savings 5,545 (15,026) -1,315 .31 2,855 
Winsorized value of retirement savings 5,658 (9,086) -346 .14 1,717 
Untrimmed net worth 31,057 (106,816) -1,874 .11 18,193 
Net worth, robust regression 31,057 (106,816) 2,889 .13 18,193 
Untrimmed total assets 93,260 (161,643) -1,630 .10 27,340 
Total assets, robust regression 93,260 (161,643) 2,362 .11 27,340 
Untrimmed total debts 62,203 (97,477) -22 .10 -16,703 
Total debts, robust regression 62,203 (97,477) 1,557 .11 -16,703 
Untrimmed liquid assets 3,870 (12,859) -753 .22 2,180 
Liquid assets, robust regression 3,870 (12,859) 791 .23 2,180 
Untrimmed short-term debt 8,251 (26,859) -2,132 .32 -4,551 
Short-term debt, robust regression 8,251 (26,859) -7 .10 -4,551 
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In this chapter, we present an overview of the central  
results of the Tulsa ADD experiment. These are  
preliminary results and are not the final findings on any 
outcome. These outcomes will be explored in more detail 
in future work.  
 
For these analyses we use a consistent methodological 
approach. We present bivariate and regression results 
and briefly discuss the findings. 
 
Homeownership 
Homeownership was the most popular intended use of 
the IDA in the CAPTC IDA program. Saving for  
homeownership also received a higher match rate (2:1) 
than the other qualified program uses (1:1).  
 
Below, we evaluate the effect of treatment assignment on 
homeownership using a variety of measures. First, we 
examine whether treatment increased the rate of  
homeownership at Wave 4. Second, we examine the  
effect of treatment on duration of homeownership  
between 1998 and 2008. Finally, we examine the effect of 
treatment on homeownership by subgroups. 
 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the estimates of the effect of 
treatment assignment on homeownership rates at Wave 
4. The effect is measured using DiD, regression, and,  
because at baseline treatment group members were less 
likely to own their home, regressions weighted with  
propensity scores. Both the treatment and control groups 
experienced large increases in homeownership between 
Wave 1 and Wave 4. As presented in Table 4.1, the  
homeownership rate at Wave 4 was 31 percentage points 
higher than at Wave 1 for treatment group respondents 
while the Wave 4 homeownership rate was 26 percentage 
points higher than at Wave 1 for the control group. 
Though the DiD analysis suggests a slight difference for 
the full sample, regression analyses show that this is a 
result of the baseline sample composition (see Table 4.2). 
There was no observed significant effect of treatment on 
the level of homeownership at Wave 4.  
 
 
 
 
There are substantial programmatic and theoretical  
reasons, though, to suspect that the effect of treatment 
may not be equivalent across all subgroups in the  
sample. In particular, those who rented at baseline faced 
a very different set of incentives and opportunities in the 
IDA program than did those who owned at baseline. 
Moreover, respondents with higher incomes at baseline 
may have been more able to accumulate the lump sum 
needed for a down payment and closing costs. Thus,  
we examine these groups separately and compare the  
treatment effect between the subgroups. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 
Regression Analysis of Homeownership Rate 
Treatment effect on homeownership 
  N  b S.E.   p  
Full sample 823 0.03 0.03 0.39 
Propensity score weighted 823 0.03 0.03 0.38 
Propensity score matched 650 0.00 0.04 0.91 
Table 4.1  
Difference in Differences Analysis of Homeownership Rates 
 Treatment Control Difference p 
 proportion proportion T-C  
Homeownership among full sample (n=852)   
Wave 1 0.21 0.26 -0.05 0.11 
Wave 4 0.53 0.52 0.01 0.80 
Wave 4-Wave 1 0.31 0.26 0.06 0.15 
Homeownership among baseline owners (n=201)  
Wave 1 1 1 0  
Wave 4 0.79 0.77 0.02 0.78 
Wave 4-Wave 1 0.79 0.77 0.02 0.78 
Homeownership among baseline renters (n=651)  
Wave 1 0 0 0  
Wave 4 0.45 0.43 0.03 0.49 
Wave 4-Wave 1 0.45 0.43 0.03 0.49 
Chapter 4 
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Table 4.3 
Subgroup Analysis of Homeownership Rates at Wave 4 
  
Baseline owner Baseline renter 
  N dF/dx [chi-sq] p N dF/dx [chi-sq] p 
Treatment effect 197 -0.01 0.86 626 0.03 0.44 
Subsample comparison test   [0.22] 0.83      
  
Median income and above Below median income 
  N dF/dx [chi-sq] p N dF/dx [chi-sq] p 
Treatment effect 413 0.11 0.04 413 -0.05 0.31 
Subsample comparison test   [5.76] 0.02       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of Interaction Between Treatment and  
Income 
In Table 4.3, we see that treatment had no impact on the 
homeownership rates of baseline renters or baseline 
owners, however there was a positive, significant impact 
of treatment on homeownership among those with an 
above-median income at baseline (about $15,480 per 
year). For the above-median income group, the treatment 
raised homeownership rates by about 10.6 percentage 
points at Wave 4 (p<0.05), statistically significant relative 
to those in the control group with above-median income. 
We tested a number of other subgroup interactions. 
Among the other factors tested, none interacted  
significantly with treatment and are not presented here.  
It is possible that the significant interaction between 
baseline income and treatment reported here results 
from multiple comparisons and random chance, rather 
than from a real effect. 
 
Duration of Homeownership 
The impact on homeownership levels observed at Wave 3 
suggests that treatment might have increased the  
duration of homeownership between 1998 and 2009 for 
those in the treatment group, relative to those in the  
control group. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the pattern of homeownership for the 
treatment and control groups using information that  
integrates retrospective and prospective data to estimate 
homeownership in each year. Figure 4.1 shows trends in  
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Figure 4.1 
Estimated Homeownership Rate, 1998/99—2008/09 
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homeownership for baseline owners, all respondents, and 
baseline renters. Among baseline renters, we observe a 
higher rate of ownership among treatment group  
members in 2003, consistent with the use of incentivized 
funds at the end of the program. Figure 4.1 shows, 
though, that the homeownership rate of the control 
group grew steadily throughout the period and that the 
homeownership rate for those in the treatment group 
was the same as that observed in the control group by 
2004. 
 
We explore this dynamic in more detail by examining the 
estimated duration of homeownership between 1998 and 
2009, defined as the number of years in that period in 
which the respondent owned a home.  
 
Control group members averaged 4.5 years of home-
ownership between 1999 and 2009 whereas  
treatment group members averaged 4.4 years of home-
ownership. The difference between the two groups is not 
statistically significant. Moreover, the aggregate  
comparison is biased by the higher rates of baseline 
homeownership in the control group. As before, the bias 
is resolved by examining trends for baseline owners and  
baseline renters separately and by the use of regression 
analysis, which controls for initial baseline status.  
 
Table 4.4 presents regression analysis of the impacts of 
the IDA program on the duration of homeownership.  
The estimated treatment effects are in the range of about 
0.1 to 0.2 years, but none of the effects are statistically 
significantly different from zero. 
 
Table 4.5 presents the impacts of IDAs on the duration of 
homeownership for the same subsamples as in Table 4.3. 
There was no effect of treatment on the duration of 
homeownership among baseline owners or among  
baseline renters. As with the analysis of the  
homeownership rate at Wave 4 presented above, IDA 
treatment affected duration of homeownership for  
Table 4.4 
Regression Analysis of Duration of Homeownership 
Treatment effect on duration of homeownership 
 N b S.E. p  
Full sample 823 0.19 0.23 0.42 
Propensity score 
weighted 
823 0.18 0.23 0.43 
Propensity score 
matched 
650 0.08 0.25 0.72 
Table 4.5 
Subgroup Analysis of Duration of Ownership at Wave 4 
  Baseline owner Baseline renter 
  N dF/dx [chi-sq] p N dF/dx [chi-sq] p 
Treatment Effect 197 0.35 0.41 626 0.20 0.47 
Subsample Comparison Test   [0.51] 0.33       
  Median income and above Below median income 
  N dF/dx [chi-sq] p N dF/dx [chi-sq] p 
Treatment Effect 413 0.87 0.01 413 -0.299 0.39 
Subsample Comparison Test   [1.17] 0.02       
15.  Where indicated, spending on home repair was winsorized at $10,000.  
16.  Where indicated, the cost of unmade repairs was winsorized at $15,000.  
17.  Where indicated, rate of home appreciation was winsorized at $25,000/year and -$25,000/year.  
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Table 4.6 
Bivariate analysis of home repair 
  
N 
Treatment Control Difference p 
  mean/prptn mean/prptn T-C  
Appreciation rate 367 4,829 3,057 1,772 0.08 
Winsorized appreciation rate 367 3,817 2,853 964 0.09 
Rate of return per year of ownership 367 25 13 12 0.36 
Expense amount 440 5,938 6,557 -619 0.57 
Winsorized expense amount 440 6,659 6,990 -332 0.25 
Amount needed 200 9,234 11,627 -2,392 0.12 
Winsorized amount needed 200 7,517 9,058 -1,541 0.03 
Any repairs 443 0.68 0.69 -0.011 0.81 
Any forgone repairs 443 0.48 0.47 0.01 0.77 
value or purchase price of a bought house) and the end of 
the observation period (Wave 4 home value or selling 
price of a sold house), divided by the number of years in 
the home during observation. 
 
As shown in Table 4.6, at Wave 4, about 68% of both 
treatment and control group members report having  
engaged in home improvement or repair costing more 
than $500 since their baseline interview. The two groups 
also report statistically equivalent amounts spent on 
home repair and are equally likely to indicate that they 
have forgone a repair that they could not afford.  
However, the estimated cost of those unmade repairs  
differs significantly between the two groups. Adjusting  
for outlying values, the treatment group reports about  
$1,500 dollars less in unmade repairs than the control 
group.  
 
We also observe a statistically significant difference in the 
rate of appreciation between treatment and control group 
members. Treatment group members gain $964 more in 
home value per year of ownership than do control group 
members. 
 
higher-income respondents relative to lower-income  
respondents. The duration of homeownership for  
treatment group members earning above the sample 
median income was 0.87 years longer than for control 
group members earning above the sample median  
income, a statistically significant difference (p<.05). 
 
Home Repair and Improvement 
Treatment group members could use IDA funds at a 
match rate of 1:1 to pay for improvements to home and 
property that they owned. We test the effect of treatment 
assignment on home repair outcomes by looking at a set 
of related outcomes. We examine whether the  
respondents engaged in home repair or improvement, 
the amount they reported spending on those efforts,
15
 
whether a repair was needed but unmade, and the  
estimated cost of those unmade repairs. 
16 
 
Because investment in improvement and repair should 
affect the value of an owned home, we also examine the 
rate of home appreciation during this period.
17
 The rate 
of home appreciation was calculated as the difference in 
self-reported home value or sale price between the  
beginning of the observation period (baseline home  
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Table 4.7 
Regression Analysis of Home Repair 
  
Full sample Baseline owners 
Treatment effect on… N b S.E. p  N b S.E. p  
Appreciation rate 330 1,203 1,175 0.30 138 2,102 958 0.02 
Winsorized appreciation rate 330 686 631 0.14 138 1,815 852 0.02 
Rate of return per year of owner-
ship 
330 26 15 0.09 138 80 49 0.11 
Expense amount 394 -539 1,113 0.69 142 -1,002 1,694 0.72 
Winsorized expense amount 765 -184 303 0.73 183 -380 690 0.71 
Amount needed 181 -1,775 1,842 0.17 73 -1,051 5,118 0.42 
Winsorized amount needed 191 -2,077 802 0.01 75 -558 2072 0.39 
Any repairs 395 0.02 0.24 0.53 125 -0.45 0.64 0.76 
Any forgone repairs 395 -0.13 0.23 0.29 137 -1.33 0.51 0.01 
Table 4.8 
Bivariate Analysis of Education Outcomes 
  
N 
Treat Cont Diff p 
  
prptn prptn T-C  
Baseline 
Less than HS 824 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.70 
HS degree 824 0.26 0.25 0.01 0.86 
Some college 824 0.41 0.42 -0.01 0.70 
College grad or more 824 0.26 0.26 0 0.98 
Outcome 
Less than HS 824 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.69 
HS degree 824 0.20 0.20 0 0.93 
Some college 824 0.37 0.33 0.03 0.32 
College grad or more 824 0.35 0.39 -0.04 0.26 
Enrolled in new course 824 0.52 0.45 0.06 0.06 
New degree from course 824 0.35 0.30 0.04 0.18 
Increase in degree level 707 0.39 0.35 0.04 0.33 
New HS degree 824 0.24 0.29 -0.04 0.70 
New some college 824 0.35 0.28 0.07 0.23 
New college grad 824 0.20 0.21 -0.01 0.76 
Enrolled in job training 824 0.24 0.26 -0.02 0.43 
Completed job training 824 0.22 0.25 -0.03 0.34 
 
These outcomes were explored further using regression 
analysis. As shown in Table 4.7, the regression analyses 
largely confirm the pattern of results observed in the  
descriptive statistics. There is no difference between the 
treatment conditions in terms of the presence of repairs, 
or the amount spent on repairs. As above, treatment 
group members in the full sample, though no more likely 
to report unmade repairs, reported that the cost of those 
unmade repairs was significantly lower. However, whereas 
we observed a difference in appreciation rate in the  
bivariate analysis, the regression analysis finds no  
significant difference in appreciation for the full sample. 
 
Because baseline owners may have been more likely than 
baseline renters to invest in home repair, we also  
analyzed that subsample as part of the regression  
analysis. When examining home repair outcomes among 
those who owned their home at baseline, several  
interesting findings emerge. Among baseline owners, 
those in the treatment group were significantly less likely 
to report needed repairs they could not afford. Baseline 
owners in the treatment group also enjoyed a significant-
ly higher rate of appreciation than did members of the 
control group. 
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Education 
As shown in Table 4.8, at baseline, the treatment and 
comparison groups are well-matched with respect to  
education level. A plurality of participants (a bit more 
than 40% in both groups) report that they have some 
college education, but not a college degree. About one-
quarter of participants in both groups report having only 
a high school diploma, while another quarter report that 
they have a college degree. Only a small percentage  
(7% in each group) report that they did not complete 
high school.  
 
At Wave 4, the distribution of educational achievement is 
changed slightly, due to a greater proportion of respond-
ents reporting higher levels of education. The proportion 
of respondents without a high school degree is essential-
ly unchanged, while the proportions with a high school 
degree or with some college are lower at Wave 4 than at 
Wave 1. The individuals who exited these categories 
seem to have moved into the college graduate category, 
which is the only category for which the proportion is 
higher at Wave 4 than at baseline. The treatment and 
control groups did not differ significantly on educational 
attainment at any level. 
 
In addition to comparing the distribution of education 
level at Wave 4, we explore several other outcomes. The 
first is whether respondents enrolled in an education  
program at any point since baseline. A larger proportion 
of treatment group members than control group  
members enrolled in such a program, and this difference 
was significant. In addition, we compare treatment 
groups on their receipt of a degree from an education 
program since baseline. About 30% of both groups  
reported receiving a degree, and there was no statistically 
significant difference between the two groups.  
 
In addition to measuring whether respondents received a 
degree, we assessed whether they reported an increased 
educational level on the categorical measure of educa-
tion. By this measure, around 35% of the control group 
and 39% of the treatment group increased their educa-
tion. The treatment and control groups did not differ  
significantly from one another on this outcome. In order 
to better understand the experience of those participants 
who increased their education, we created a series of  
variables to indicate whether a respondent had achieved a 
high school diploma, some college, or a college degree  
 
since baseline. Each of these variables is only created for 
those respondents who had a lower level of education at 
baseline, reducing the sample size for the analyses of  
these variables. It is possible for a respondent to be  
coded as having achieved more than one type of  
additional education. For example, if an individual had a 
high school diploma at baseline, but was able to earn a 
college degree over the course of the study period, he 
would be coded as having newly earned both ‘some  
college’ and a college degree. The proportion of  
treatment and control groups achieving each kind of new 
education are roughly the same, except for a higher  
proportion of treatment group members achieving some 
college. Bivariate analyses of these variables show no  
difference between the two treatment groups.  
 
To further explore the potential relationship between 
treatment and educational outcomes, we conducted  
marginal effects probit regression analyses predicting 
outcomes from treatment assignment while controlling 
for a variety of covariates.  
 
Table 4.9 shows the treatment effect as the marginal  
difference between treatment and control. It is interpreted 
as the difference between the proportion of treatment  
 
Table 4.9 
Propensity Score Weighted Regression Analysis of  
Education Outcomes 
Treatment effect on… N dF/dx  S.E. p 
Increase in education 548 0.04 0.04 0.37 
New some college 267 0.11 0.06 0.09 
New college degree 609 -0.01 0.02 0.69 
Enroll in class 824 0.06 0.04 0.09 
New degree 824 0.04 0.03 0.23 
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group and control group members achieving the  
outcome.  
 
We observe a small but significant effect of treatment on 
the likelihood that a respondent enrolled in an education 
program (p<0.10). However, there is no significant impact 
on the likelihood of earning a degree, or on the likelihood 
of increasing education level. When examining the  
estimated effect of treatment on the likelihood of gaining 
certain levels of education, we find that there is a  
marginally significant impact on the likelihood of gaining 
‘some college’ during the study period, but not on the 
likelihood of earning a college degree. Due to small  
sample size, the few respondents who earned a high 
school degree during the study period are not analyzed. 
Finally, with regard to the job training outcomes, there is 
no evidence of a positive treatment effect. 
 
There is reason to believe that treatment may have  
differential impacts on certain subsamples of respond-
ents. To explore this possibility, we examined the  
treatment effect separately for subsamples based on  
gender, income, and whether the respondent was banked 
at baseline. We did so for three major outcomes:  
enrollment in an educational program, receipt of a  
degree, and increased education. Marginal effects probit 
models were used to estimate treatment effects. Table 
4.10 presents results of these analyses. For each  
subsample we present the estimated treatment effect.  
 
Subsample on Gender 
With regard to subsamples based on gender, men  
Table 4.10 
Subgroup Analysis of Education Outcomes  
  Enrolled in school 
Acquired degree or certificate  
from school 
Increased education level 
  Female (n=659) Male (n=152) Female (n=659) Male (n=145) Female (n=435) Male (n=110) 
  
dF/dx 
[chi-sq] 
p dF/dx p 
dF/dx 
[chi-sq] 
p dF/dx p 
dF/dx 
[chi-sq] 
p dF/dx p 
Treatment effect 0.06 0.16 0.20 0.04 0.03 0.46 0.14 0.05 -0.03 0.55 0.43 0.01 
Subsample  
comparison test 
[2.08] 0.15     [4.57] 0.03     [18.20] 0.00     
  
R < median 
income (n=400) 
R > median 
income (n=424) 
R < median 
income (n=400) 
R > median 
income (n=424) 
R < median in-
come (n=284) 
R > median 
income (n=264) 
  
dF/dx 
[chi-sq] 
p dF/dx p 
dF/dx 
[chi-sq] 
p dF/dx p 
dF/dx 
[chi-sq] 
p dF/dx p 
Treatment effect 0.06 0.27 0.02 0.76 0.08 0.10 -0.02 0.64 0.09 0.16 0.01 0.89 
Subsample  
comparison test 
[0.34] 0.56     [2.38] 0.12     [0.86] 0.35     
  
Banked  
(n=697) 
Not banked 
(n=126) 
Banked  
(n=697) 
Not banked 
(n=113) 
Banked  
(n=449) 
Not banked 
(n=82) 
  
dF/dx 
[chi-sq] 
p dF/dx p 
dF/dx 
[chi-sq] 
p dF/dx p 
dF/dx 
[chi-sq] 
p dF/dx p 
Treatment effect 0.06 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.03 0.20 0.22 0.02 0.06 0.23 0.02 0.90 
Subsample  
comparison test 
[1.14] 0.29     [4.67] 0.03     [0.05] 0.83     
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experience a larger effect of treatment on education  
outcomes than women. For the likelihood of enrollment 
in school, the treatment effect for men (dF/Dx=0.20, 
p<0.05) is much larger than that for women (dF/Dx=0.06, 
p>0.10). Nevertheless, the post-test of the difference  
between the two treatment effects was not significant. In 
the case of the receipt of degree outcome, the treatment 
effect once again differs by gender, showing a large and 
significant impact for men (dF/Dx=0.14, p<0.10), and a 
smaller impact for women (dF/Dx=0.03, p=0.46). In this 
case, the treatment effect for women is not statistically 
significant, and the comparison between the two  
treatment effects revealed that they are significantly  
different from one another (p<0.05). In our examination 
of the increased education outcome, the pattern is  
repeated: men experience a large and significant impact 
(dF/Dx=0.43, p<0.01), while the treatment effect for 
women is non-significant (dF/Dx= -0.03, p=0.55), and 
these treatment effects are significantly different 
(p<0.01). 
Subsample on Income 
A similar set of subsample analyses were conducted for 
groups divided by income level at baseline. Specifically, 
we compared treatment effects on those who earned the 
median income or more at baseline, and those who made 
less. For the enrollment outcome, the treatment effect is 
not significant for either group. For the degree outcome, 
there is no effect of treatment on those with below-
median income or those with higher incomes. A similar 
pattern was seen with regard to the increased education 
outcome. There is no significant effect of treatment on 
higher-income respondents or on those with below-
median incomes. The treatment effect comparison tests 
for both the degree and increased education outcomes 
were non-significant.  
 
Subsample on Banked and Unbanked 
Finally, we analyzed subsamples composed of those who 
were banked and unbanked at baseline. For the enroll-
ment outcome, there is not a significant impact on either 
Table 4.11 
Bivariate Analysis of Business Ownership 
   Treatment Control Difference p 
  N mean/proportion mean/proportion T-C  
Business equity 845 7,365 4,204 3,161 0.32 
Winsorized business equity 845 741 664 76 0.64 
Number of part-time employees 854 0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.16 
Number of full-time employees 854 0.07 0.08 -0.01 0.72 
Age of the business 120 10.19 9.75 0.43 0.80 
Business ownership 855 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.89 
Table 4.12 
Regression Analysis of Business Ownership 
  Full sample Wave 4 business owners 
Treament effect on… N b S.E. p N b S.E. p 
Business equity 760 -169 2,735 0.95 97 6,094 24,729 0.81 
Winsorized business equity 760 -53 169 0.75 97 830 1,082 0.45 
Business ownership 760 -0.13 0.13 0.40     
*Where noted, business equity is winsorized at $10,000. 
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Table 4.13 
Bivariate Analysis of Retirement Savings         
  N Treat Cont Diff p 
  
  
mean/ 
prptn 
mean/ 
prptn 
T-C  
Any dedicated  
retirement savings 
853 0.44 0.42 0.03 0.48 
Mean value of  
retirement savings 
785 4,836 5,500 -664 0.56 
Winsorized mean 
value of  
retirement savings 
785 3,559 3,795 -236 0.66 
Table 4.14 
Regressions for Retirement Savings  
Treatment effect on… N b S.E. p 
Any dedicated retirement sav-
ings 
687 0.11 0.17 0.52 
Mean value of retirement sav-
ings 
687 -1,315 1,131 0.25 
Winsorized mean value of re-
tirement savings 
687 -346 504 0.49 
the banked (dF/Dx=0.06, p>0.10) or unbanked (dF/
Dx=0.20, p>0.10). Although the treatment effect for the 
unbanked is much larger than that for the banked  
respondents, the post-test comparing treatment effects 
was not significant. An even more pronounced difference 
was visible with regard to the degree attainment  
outcome. Banked respondents did not experience a  
significant treatment effect, while unbanked respondents 
had a large and significant treatment effect (dF/Dx=0.22,  
p<0.10). Post-testing indicated that the difference  
between the two treatment effects was significant. For 
the increased education outcome, however, the pattern is 
not repeated. There is no significant treatment effect on 
either the banked or unbanked subsamples, and the  
difference between the two was also not significant. 
 
Business Ownership and Equity 
At baseline, about 7% of the sample reported owning a 
business. While this proportion substantially increased  
 
 
between baseline and Wave 4 (13% of respondents own  
a business at Wave 4), there was no significant effect of 
treatment on business ownership at Wave 4. 
 
In Table 4.11, we see that about 13% of each group 
owned a business at Wave 4. We also find that while the 
treatment group had $3,161 more in business equity,  
19.  Where noted, the value of retirement savings is winsorized at $25,000. 
after adjusting for outliers
18
 and looking at the full  
sample, there was no difference in business equity  
between treatment and control group members. The  
regression analyses presented in Table 4.12 confirm the 
findings from the descriptive analyses; control and  
treatment group members do not differ with respect  
to business. 
 
Retirement Savings 
One qualified use of IDA savings was to roll the funds 
over into an IRA account. For participants who used their 
savings for contributing to their retirement account, 
which was the third most common savings goal among 
IDA account holders, participants were given a 1:1 match. 
To assess the impact of IDA participation on retirement 
savings 6 years after program completion, we compared 
treatment and control group members on both the  
presence and value of retirement savings.
19 
 
As shown in Table 4.13, bivariate comparisons did not 
reveal statistically significant differences between the two 
groups with regard to retirement savings outcomes. 
Slightly more than 40% of both groups reported having 
dedicated retirement savings such as IRAs and 401(k)s. 
The value of these savings was roughly $5,000 for both 
groups, although this amount was closer to $4,000 once 
we adjusted for extreme values.  
 
These results were further explored using regression  
analysis and controlling for relevant covariates (see Table  
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Figure 4.2 
Distribution of Selected Wealth Variables, Change from 
1998/99 to 2008/09 
 
4.14). Regression analyses did not detect significant  
differences between groups. It is important to note,  
however, that these analyses are based on self-reported 
data about dedicated retirement accounts. Thus, the data 
do not reflect savings that may be intended for use  
during retirement but which are saved in other ways, for 
instance, long-term retirement savings that may be held 
in a general savings account. Furthermore, due to  
self-reporting, the data may not be a precise measure  
of the actual value of retirement accounts.  
 
Wealth, Assets, and Liabilities 
One of the long-term impacts of interest is the impact of 
Tulsa IDAs on wealth accumulation. The study of net 
worth is frequently hampered by methodological  
challenges. Our analysis attempts to address some of  
these issues including item-missing data, outliers, and 
heteroskedasticity. In this section, we present findings on 
five wealth outcomes: net worth, total assets, total debt, 
liquid assets, and short-term debt. Because value can be 
shuffled among these, our key outcome in this analysis is 
net worth. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows box plots of each outcome for all  
respondents. Box plots show the dispersion of the  
variables and are useful in the identification of outliers. 
For each variable, shown here as change in value be-
tween Wave 1 and Wave 4, the box plot shows five distri-
butional characteristics. The box itself represents the lo-
cation of the 25
th
 percentile (bottom of the box) and the 
75
th
  
percentile (the top of the box). The line inside the box is 
the median. The braces beyond the box extend 1.5 times 
the interquartile range (distance between the 25
th
 and 
75
th
 percentile in each direction) and data outside of the 
braces are indicated by dots. As in all other wealth data, 
our wealth outcomes are characterized by fairly compact 
interquartile ranges, low medians, skewed distributions, 
and large numbers of extreme outliers. 
 
Because of the large number of outliers, concerns arise 
about the influence of outlying cases on our estimates of 
the treatment effect. In the analyses below, we attempt to 
reduce the influence of outlying cases through the use of 
symmetrical trimming and robust regression. We also 
show findings with multiple approaches to item-missing 
data. As discussed above, net worth measures are  
comprised of variables gauging the level of assets and 
debt (33 in total). A large portion of Wave 4 respondents 
are missing information on at least one of these 33 
measures. Consequently, data are imputed using multiple 
imputations through chained equations. The creation and 
analysis of implicates allows us to incorporate into our 
analyses the characteristics of those who are dropped by 
listwise deletion. Data are imputed for each item and  
aggregated variables are regenerated in each implicate.  
 
Table 4.15 shows the results of the regressions, using  
listwise deletion. The results above demonstrate the  
challenges of inference on a variable with the character-
istics of our wealth measures. First, in this version,  
because we trim on extreme changes from Wave 1 to 
Wave 4 in the outcome variable, different cases are 
trimmed in each analysis. In addition, results are  
inconsistent between different trim levels and between 
trimmed and robust regressions. Significance level,  
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Table 4.15 
Regression Analysis of Wealth Outcomes, Unimputed Data 
 
Untrimmed 2.5 % on W4- W1 extremes 5% on W4-W1 extremes Robust regressions 
b/se p b/se p b/se p b/se p 
Net worth 
Treatment -9209 0.46 -6,423 0.24 -1,316 0.76 -3,670 0.34 
 [12,569]  [5,400]  [4,341]  [3,863]  
N 348 330 312 348     
Total assets 
Treatment 2,268 0.89 5,898 0.42 7,493 0.23 7,674 0.19 
 [16,122]  [7,291]  [6,246]  [5,781]  
N 447 423 401 447     
Total debts 
Treatment -2,145 0.76 -71 0.99 598 0.87 573 0.87 
 [7,128]  [4,170]  [3,740]  [3,619]  
N 657 623 591 657     
Liquid assets 
Treatment -724 0.39 -234 0.38 -223 0.23 98 0.06 
 [842]  [265]  [187]  [52]  
N 748 710 672 748     
Short-term debt 
Treatment -748 0.60 1,103 0.04 489 0.27 175 0.58 
 [1,426]  [543]  [443]  [318]  
N 745 706 669 745     
Table 4.16 
Regression Analysis of Wealth Outcomes, Imputed Data 
 
Untrimmed 2.5 % on W4- W1 extremes 5% on W4-W1 extremes Robust regressions 
b/se p b/se p b/se p b/se p 
Net worth 
Treatment -1,874 0.80 2,439 0.49 3,819 0.19 2,889 0.30 
 [7,310]  [3,478]  [2,904]  [2,747]  
N 855 810 763 855     
Total assets 
Treatment -1,630 0.87 2,565 0.64 -800 0.86 2,362 0.60 
 [10,231]  [5,460]  [4,600]  [4,546]  
N 855 808 765 855     
Total debts 
Treatment -22 0.99 909 0.81 1,849 0.59 1,557 0.64 
 [6,185]  [3,866]  [3,434]  [3,365]  
N 855 809 765 855     
Liquid assets 
Treatment -753 0.33 -259 0.30 -212 0.22 79 0.10 
 [765]  [245]  [172]  [47]  
N 855 810 766 855     
Short-term debt 
Treatment -2,132 0.12 369 0.31 -75 0.77 -7 0.92 
 [1,384]  [362]  [251]  [64]  
N 855 810 764 855     
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Table 4.17 
Bivariate Analysis of Psychological Outcomes 
  
N 
Treatment Control Diff p 
  mean mean T-C  
CES-D 10 817 7.41 6.69 0.722 0.10 
Zimbardo 817 1.19 1.18 0.004 0.87 
Stress 817 23.51 23.25 0.260 0.63 
Table 4.18 
Regression Analysis of Psychological Outcomes 
Treatment effect on… N b S.E. p  
CES-D 10 817 0.62 0.44 0.16 
Zimbardo  817 0.00 0.03 0.17 
Stress 817 0.22 0.54 0.68 
magnitude of impact, and even sign direction of the  
impact all change between analyses. Even after trimming, 
large magnitudes of impact are insignificant because of 
the size of the standard errors. This leads to results that 
are hard to interpret. The top line result is large and  
negative. Given this we expect, at the mean, for the point 
estimates of the effect on total debt to be larger than the 
effect on total assets. Instead, we find the opposite. We 
suspect that missing data contribute substantially to this 
finding. Notice that the sample size changes between 
analyses. This is because different respondents are  
missing on different outcome variables. We address this 
here through the use of imputation. 
 
Looking at the impacts on the indicators of wealth in  
Table 4.16, the results are mixed. After adjusting for  
outliers, there is a moderate but non-significant effect of 
treatment on net worth (in robust regressions, $2,889, 
p=0.30). We observe a similarly large impact on total  
assets and total debts, with assignment to treatment  
substantially but non-significantly increasing both. There 
is a marginally significant but economically small effect of 
treatment on liquid assets. Assignment to treatment is 
associated with $79 more in liquid assets, relative to the 
control group.  
 
Using the imputed data the results at each level of trim 
are more internally consistent. It is also worth noting that, 
while nothing approaches conventional levels of signifi-
cance, the sign of the treatment effect on net worth is 
positive at higher levels of trim. Still, given our findings in 
the full case data and incorporating methods to correct 
for missing data and distributional problems, there is no 
evidence of a treatment effect on wealth after 10 years. 
 
Psychological Outcomes 
The Wave 4 survey included several standardized scales 
of psychological outcomes including depressive  
symptoms, stress, and future orientation. These measures 
are new and were not included at baseline. At Wave 4, 
depressive symptoms were measured with the Center for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression 10-item scale  
(CES-D-10), stress was measured with questions  
developed by Cohen, Kamarck, and Mermelstein, and 
future orientation was measured with the Zimbardo scale 
(Andresen, Malmgren, Carter & Patrick, 1994; Cohen,  
Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2003). 
 
In the descriptive statistics, we observe no significant  
differences between the two groups with respect to these 
outcomes. The groups are markedly similar on the  
frequency of depressive symptoms, their future  
orientation, and their level of stress. This pattern of  
results was confirmed in regression analysis presented in 
Table 4.18. 
 
Health and Use of Tobacco and Alcohol 
The Wave 4 survey instrument included questions about 
the health of respondents and use of tobacco and  
alcohol. The health outcomes include body mass index 
(BMI), self-assessment of health, and measures of  
20. Where noted, total monthly household income, 2007 household income, and monthly income from work are winsorized at $5,000, $60,000, and 
$5,000, respectively. 
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Table 4.19 
Bivariate Analysis of Health and Substance Use Outcomes   
   Treatment Control Difference p 
  N mean/prptn mean/prptn T-C  
Body mass index 798 30.52 30.34 0.18 0.75 
Health relative to others your age (higher scores indicate poorer health) 798 1.71 1.69 0.02 0.80 
Health is poor or fair relative to others my age (dichotomous) 798 0.22 0.19 0.03 0.30 
Pain interferes with normal work (higher scores indicate more interference) 798 1.19 1.07 0.11 0.18 
Pain interferes with work not at all (dichotomous) 798 0.39 0.40 -0.01 0.82 
Pain interferes with work quite a bit or extremely (dichotomous) 798 0.17 0.13 0.04 0.14 
Health limits moderate activities a lot 798 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.98 
Health limits ability to climb stairs a lot 798 0.12 0.15 -0.03 0.27 
Medical expenses in the past year ($) 798 1,222 1,132 90 0.57 
Medical expenses in the past year, winsorized 798 848 878 -30 0.69 
Drinking behavior      
Drinks 2-3x per week or more 812 0.10 0.11 -0.01 0.48 
Binge drinks monthly or more 812 0.07 0.09 -0.02 0.24 
Alcohol screen score (range 0-12) 812 1.41 1.58 -0.17 0.25 
Meets alcohol screen threshold for brief intervention 812 0.12 0.13 -0.01 0.67 
Smoking behavior      
Smoked in the last 30 days 812 0.33 0.32 0.01 0.58 
Number of cigarettes smoked in past week 812 22.33 23.08 -0.75 0.82 
Table 4.20 
Regression Analysis of Health and Substance Use Outcomes  
  N b/OR S.E. p  
Body mass index 798 0.00 0.54 0.99 
Health relative to others your age (higher scores indicate poorer health) 798 0.02 0.07 0.78 
Health is poor or fair relative to others my age (dichotomous) 798 1.19 0.23 0.36 
Pain interferes with normal work (higher scores indicate more interference) 798 0.10 0.08 0.23 
Pain interferes with work not at all (dichotomous) 798 0.98 0.15 0.77 
Pain interferes with work quite a bit or extremely (dichotomous) 798 1.34 0.29 0.18 
Health limits moderate activities a lot 798 0.90 0.24 0.68 
Health limits ability to climb stairs a lot 798 0.78 0.18 0.29 
Medical expenses in the past year ($) 798 72.77 158.96 0.65 
Medical expenses in the past year, winsorized 798 -25.25 72.66 0.73 
Drinking behavior     
Drinks 2-3x per week or more 812 0.94 0.24 0.81 
Binge drinks monthly or more 812 0.76 0.23 0.36 
Alcohol screen score (range 0-12) 812 -0.12 0.14 0.42 
Meets alcohol screen threshold for brief intervention 812 0.99 0.23 0.96 
Smoking behavior     
Smoked in the last 30 days 812 1.17 0.19 0.35 
Number of cigarettes smoked in past week 812 0.22 3.24 0.95 
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Table 4.22 
Regression Analysis of Employment and Income Outcomes 
Treament effect on… N b S.E. p  
Total household income (monthly) 713 -180 176 0.31 
Winsorized total household income (monthly) 713 -108 100 0.28 
2007 household income (annual) 714 -905 2,123 0.67 
Winsorized 2007 household income (annual) 714 -1,224 1,207 0.31 
Income from work (monthly) 732 -262 164 0.11 
Winsorized income from work (monthly) 732 -145 106 0.17 
Proportion employed FT/PT/self 768 -0.09 0.20 0.65 
Proportion with 2+ jobs 768 -0.06 0.21 0.01 
Table 4.21 
Bivariate Analysis of Employment and Income Outcomes 
  
N 
Treatment Control Difference p 
  mean/proportion mean/proportion T-C  
Total household income (monthly) 786 2,955 3,079 -124 0.49 
Winsorized total household income (monthly) 786 2,586 2,678 -92 0.38 
2007 household income (annual) 794 35,431 35,485 -53 0.98 
Winsorized 2007 household income (annual) 794 30,690 31,659 -970 0.44 
Income from work (monthly) 814 2,398 2,573 -175 0.31 
Winsorized income from work (monthly) 814 2,144 2,251 -107 0.35 
Proportion employed FT/PT/self 855 0.78 0.80 -0.01 0.70 
Proportion with 2+ jobs 855 0.14 0.21 -0.06 0.02 
limitations imposed by health. Substance use questions 
gauged the frequency of respondent’s use of alcohol and 
tobacco products. 
 
As shown in Table 4.19, among respondents in the  
treatment and control groups, the mean body mass was 
over 30, the cut-off for obesity used by the NIH. Still the 
majority of those in both groups consider themselves in 
good health generally and among those their age. Few 
respondents in either group report restrictions on activity 
from poor health. Fewer than 10% of respondents binge 
drink monthly and few meet the criteria for problem 
drinking. About one in three respondents report having 
used tobacco in the past month. In bivariate analysis, we 
observe no statistically significant difference between the 
two groups on health and substance abuse measures. 
 
In regression analysis, we observe no difference between 
the treatment and control groups on health and sub-
stance use outcomes. Similarly we find that those from 
the treatment group incur major medical expenses at the 
same level as those in the control group. 
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Table 4.23 
Bivariate Analysis of Economic Hardship 
  
 Treatment Control Difference p 
  
N mean/ prptn mean/ prptn T-C  
Difficulty Paying Bills in Past Year 
     
Rent or mortgage 812 0.31 0.29 0.03 0.43 
Medical care 812 0.37 0.34 0.03 0.40 
Dental care 812 0.44 0.38 0.06 0.09 
Prescription medication 812 0.36 0.31 0.05 0.12 
Difficulty paying any of the above 812 0.62 0.61 0.01 0.70 
Count of types of bills had difficulty paying (of 4) 812 1.49 1.33 0.16 0.09 
Change in financial situation since last interview      
Financial situation has worsened since last interview 812 0.32 0.26 0.06 0.08 
Financial situation has improved since last interview 812 0.41 0.43 -0.02 0.57 
Felt it was hard or very hard to make ends meet 812 0.59 0.57 0.02 0.57 
Sometimes or often did not have enough to eat in past 4 months 812 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.63 
Table 4.24 
Regression Analysis of Economic Hardship 
  N b/OR S.E. p  
Difficulty Paying Bills in Past Year     
Rent or mortgage 812 1.11 0.19 0.53 
Medical care 812 1.08 0.17 0.62 
Dental care 812 1.26 0.20 0.13 
Prescription medication 812 1.26 0.20 0.16 
Difficulty paying any of the above 812 1.01 0.16 0.93 
Count of types of bills had difficulty paying (of 4), OLS 812 0.13 0.10 0.16 
Count of types of bills had difficulty paying (of 4), Poisson 812 0.09 0.06 0.12 
Change in financial situation since last interview     
Financial situation has worsened since last interview 812 1.23 0.20 0.22 
Financial situation has improved since last interview 812 0.93 0.14 0.61 
Felt it was hard or very hard to make ends meet 812 1.06 0.17 0.70 
Sometimes or often did not have enough to eat in past 4 months 812 1.08 0.25 0.76 
21.  Where noted, amount owed on mortgages is winsorized at $150,000. 
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Table 4.25 
Bivariate Analysis of Loan Characteristics and Performance  
  Full sample Baseline renters 
  
N 
Treat Cont Diff p 
N 
Treat Cont Diff p 
  
mean/                                      
prptn 
mean/                                      
prptn 
T-C  
mean/                                      
prptn 
mean/                      
prptn 
T-C  
Amount owed on mortgages 805 39,346 34,183 5,162 0.27 621 40,406 32,425 7,982 0.15 
Winsorized amount owed on mortgages 805 33,719 30,766 2,953 0.37 621 33,756 29,247 4,509 0.24 
Monthly mortgage payment 315 765 766 -1 0.98 243 798 764 33 0.54 
Rate of primary mortgage 272 6.46 6.41 0.05 0.86 211 6.60 6.47 0.14 0.67 
Have mortgage 839 0.44 0.44 0 0.99 642 0.40 0.38 0.02 0.69 
Is primary mortgage fixed rate 317 0.90 0.91 -0.01 0.72 242 0.91 0.95 -0.04 0.25 
Ever refinanced 367 0.30 0.26 0.04 0.40 251 0.27 0.18 0.09 0.11 
Ever 30 days late 366 0.35 0.32 0.03 0.61 251 0.36 0.33 0.03 0.63 
Ever 90 days late 365 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.04 249 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Ever foreclosed upon 855 0.03 0.03 0 0.58 652 0.03 0.02 0 0.94 
Table 4.26 
Regression Analysis of Loan Characteristics and Performance  
   Full sample     Baseline renters   
Treatment effect on… N b S.E. p  N b S.E. p  
Amount owed on mortgages 727 -387 4,328 0.93 556 1,842 5,164 0.72 
Winsorized amount owed on mortgages 727 174 3,269 0.96 556 1,846 3,821 0.63 
Monthly mortgage payment 279 -30 54 0.58 213 17 63 0.79 
Rate of primary mortgage 240 -0.03 0.32 0.93 184 0.01 0.39 0.98 
Have mortgage 755 0.01 0.16 0.97 573 -0.01 0.19 0.98 
Is primary mortgage fixed rate 281 0.24 0.58 0.68 201 -0.38 0.81 0.64 
Ever refinanced 326 0.16 0.29 0.59 220 0.48 0.46 0.30 
Ever 30 days late 325 -0.17 0.29 0.56 220 -0.29 0.39 0.46 
Ever 90 days late 307 0.58 0.46 0.21 213 0.97 0.67 0.15 
Employment and Wages 
 
At Wave 4, respondents were asked detailed questions 
about their current employment and earnings. As shown 
in Table 4.21, there is no significant difference between 
treatment and control group members at Wave 4 with 
respect to employment rate or earnings.
20
 Treatment 
group members are, however, less likely to be working 
multiple jobs at Wave 4. Both groups report, after  
adjusting for outliers, about $2,600 per month in total pre
-tax household income (in the survey month) from all 
sources. For the year prior to the survey, the treatment 
and control groups, on average, report a statistically 
identical yearly income of about $31,000. Both the  
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treatment and control group accrue most of their income 
from work. In addition 14% of treatment group members 
report working multiple jobs as compared to 21% of con-
trol group members.  
 
Regression analysis, shown in Table 4.22, confirms the 
descriptive results and finds that treatment assignment 
significantly reduces the odds of holding multiple jobs at 
Wave 4. Earnings and employment rate, however, were 
not statistically different between treatment and control 
members at Wave 4.  
 
Material Hardship  
At Wave 4, study participants were asked if they  
experienced a range of material hardship as well as their 
perception of their financial situation at the time of their 
interview. About 6 in 10 respondents in both groups  
reported being unable to pay at least one bill during the 
year prior to their Wave 4 interview (see Table 4.23).  For 
both the treatment and control groups, more  
respondents reported being unable to pay a dental bill 
than any other. About 30% of respondents in each group 
reported having missed a rent or mortgage payment. 
Slightly more than 10% reported experiencing food  
insecurity in the 4 months prior to their interview.  
  
Still, a plurality of both groups reported that their  
financial situation had improved since their last ADD  
interview. In bivariate and regression analyses, no  
differences between treatment and control group  
members were observed. 
  
Loan Terms and Performance 
Respondents who had mortgage debt at Wave 4 were 
asked about the characteristics of the mortgage(s) they 
held at the time of the interview. Below, we report  
findings on the characteristics of the loan with the largest 
value held by respondents.
21
 In addition, we report on 
loan performance characteristics including refinancing,  
30-day delinquency, 90-day delinquency and foreclosure. 
About 44% of both the treatment and control group 
owed money on a mortgage at Wave 4. As shown in  
Table 4.25, in bivariate analyses, there were no significant 
differences on presence of a mortgage or outstanding 
mortgage debt between the treatment and control 
groups. The terms of the primary loans held by members 
of each group were not statistically different. About 90%
of each group had a fixed rate loan and the average  
interest rate for both groups was about 6.4%.  
  
While there was no difference in the proportion of each 
group who had ever been 30 days late on mortgage  
payments, in bivariate analysis, those in the treatment 
group were significantly more likely to have experienced 
90-day delinquency than members of the control group. 
Because many of the primary loans held by baseline  
owners were originated before the start of the CAPTC IDA 
program, we examine the loans held by baseline renters 
separately. From bivariate analysis of baseline renters, we 
note that those in the treatment group are more likely to 
have been 90-days delinquent. 
  
The patterns of association between loan characteristics 
and performance and treatment assignment seen in  
bivariate analysis are also seen when the data are  
examined using regression techniques (see Table 4.26). 
We find no difference between the treatment and control 
groups on loan characteristics and loan performance 
among the full sample or among baseline renters. 
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The ADD4 study provides the first empirical evidence 
from a randomized, longitudinal experiment on the  
long-term impacts of a short-term IDA program on  
economic, psychological, and health outcomes among 
low-income families. The fourth wave of data for the ADD 
experiment was collected from treatment and control 
group members about 6 years after program completion 
and 10 years after random assignment. This follow-up 
provides policy makers and practitioners the opportunity 
to examine impacts of an IDA program on asset building, 
years after the savings program has ended.  
 
Below we present a summary of results on the five key 
allowable uses of IDAs: homeownership, home  
maintenance and repair, post-secondary education,  
business and retirement savings. We also summarize the 
results for net worth.  
 
Homeownership 
The treatment and control groups both experienced  
substantial and ongoing increases in homeownership 
rates over the 10-year study period (1998 to 2008). The 
rates of increase in homeownership for the ADD4 sample 
are high compared with the homeownership rate for the 
nationally representative PSID survey sample (Grinstein-
Weiss, Sherraden, Gale, Rohe, Schreiner, & Key, 2011). 
The increased homeownership rate is especially notable 
given the broader economic crisis gripping the nation in 
the later years of the study period.  
 
Participation in the Tulsa IDA program, however, did not 
result in a significantly higher homeownership rate 10 
years after the program began. Earlier findings (Grinstein
-Weiss et al., 2008; Mills, Gale, et al., 2008) showed a  
statistically significant programmatic effect on home-
ownership rates among baseline renters as of 2003. The 
longer-term findings show that assignment to the IDA 
program may have accelerated the onset of home-
ownership for treatment group households, but in the 
long run, it did not result in a homeownership rate  
statistically different from the control group. The gap in 
the homeownership rate between the treatment and 
control groups narrowed rapidly after the program  
ended in 2003. Thus, the IDA program did not result in a 
significant increase in the homeownership rate 10 years 
after it began, nor did it increase the duration of home-
ownership during that time.  
 
For the subgroup of people with above-sample median 
annual incomes at baseline (about $15,500 per year), 
assignment to the treatment group significantly  
increased the homeownership rate and duration of  
homeownership. This may indicate that while IDA  
programs are not effective in promoting homeownership 
among very-low-income households, they may be  
effective for households with higher, although still  
modest, levels of income. It should be noted, however, 
that subgroup analysis was conducted on 11 dependent 
variables and only income was significant. Thus, it is  
possible that this finding is the result of chance. If the  
income and homeownership result is not due to chance, 
then it may be that IDA programs should target those 
participants with somewhat higher incomes for home-
ownership, which is a major financial and practical  
undertaking, and steer very-low-income participants  
toward other assets such as education, which may be less 
of a financial challenge.  
 
In addition, given the economic climate and changes that 
occurred in the housing market during the study period, 
including the expansion of sub-prime lending, it is  
important to note that the vast majority of treatment and 
control group members with housing financing received 
fixed-rate mortgages, with relatively low interest rates.  
 
 
The lack of statistically significant effect of the IDA  
program on the full sample of program participants might 
be due to several factors. First, housing prices in the Tulsa 
area were relatively affordable during the study period. 
The median home value in 2001 was about $111,000, well 
below the national median. Thus, buying a home in Tulsa 
was relatively easy compared to many housing markets, 
making the IDA program less important in buying a 
home. Second, other Tulsa area homebuyer assistance 
programs were available for control group members. At 
least one of those programs provided down-payment 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
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assistance and homeownership counseling without the 
savings requirement. Also, as presented above, both 
groups appear to have received good quality loans. 
 
IDA programs may be more effective in assisting low-
income households purchasing homes in higher cost 
housing markets and/or in markets where there are fewer 
alternative sources of mortgage assistance and home-
ownership training. 
 
Home Maintenance and Repair 
Over two-thirds of homeowners, both treatment and  
control group members, reported making home repairs 
over $500 during the 10-year study period. For the full 
sample, there was no impact of the treatment on home 
repairs, on the dollar amount spent on repairs, or on 
housing price appreciation. However, treatment group 
members did report that the estimated cost of unmade 
repairs was significantly lower compared with the control 
group members.  
 
Moreover, among baseline homeowners, we find that two 
of the five measured effects of the IDA on home  
maintenance and repair yielded significant and  
economically meaningful results. Treatment group home-
owners were less likely to report skipping needed home 
repairs and had a higher rate of housing price  
appreciation during the program period than control 
group homeowners. These findings suggest that being 
assigned to the IDA intervention may have helped those 
who owned their homes at the start of the IDA program 
to maintain and improve their homes over the 10-year 
study period, and to experience a greater increase in 
housing price appreciation. 
 
The fact that IDA program participants as a whole spent 
the same amount as control group members on home 
repairs and yet reported lower costs of forgone repairs 
suggests that, compared to the control group, they either 
purchased homes that were in better condition or they 
achieved more repairs for the same cost by doing home 
repairs themselves. Both of these possible explanations 
could be the result of the homeownership counseling and 
training courses required of program participants  
intending to use their matched savings to buy homes.  
 
Education  
Among treatment group members present at Wave 4, a 
small percentage (8.3%) planned to save for education 
expenses. Among all the matched withdrawals made, 
6.9% were put toward education uses. Despite such a 
small group saving for education, we find a significant 
impact on education enrollment 10 years after baseline 
assignment (6 years after program completion). The  
enrollment results are similar to results from learn$ave, a 
randomized IDA experiment in Canada (N=3,584), which 
finds a significant treatment effect on enrollment in  
community college and university programs six months 
after the program ended (Leckie et al., 2010). In ADD4, we 
also find a significant impact on the likelihood of gaining 
“some college” education among treatment group  
members compared to the control group.  
 
In addition, the data show positive, but non-significant, 
effects on degree completion and increase in level of  
education. There are several possible explanations as to 
why we do not find a significant impact on these  
outcomes. First, while IDAs can provide some resources, 
such as financial capital and information, there are many 
additional barriers faced by non-traditional students that 
IDAs are not designed to address (Taniguchi & Kaufman, 
2005). Second, effects on educational attainment may 
take longer to develop than the 6-year time frame  
between the program end and this study. This may be 
especially true for non-traditional students who enroll on 
a part-time basis.  
 
In subgroup analysis, evidence suggests that men may 
benefit more from the IDA program in terms of  
educational enrollment and attainment compared with 
women. Interestingly, the administrative data (MIS IDA) 
also indicates that males were more likely than females to 
take a matched withdrawal for education. This is an  
important finding, given that there is a disturbing trend of 
declining educational attainment among minority and 
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lower-income males in the United States (King, 2000; Kim, 
2011). Our current data cannot illuminate the channels 
through which IDAs may have this effect, and this is an 
important question for future research. 
 
Business Ownership 
Among treatment group members present at Wave 4, 
only 5.7% had planned at baseline to save for business 
ownership. About half of those saving for business  
ownership actually made a matched withdrawal. For the 
full sample, the proportion of business ownership  
substantially increased between baseline and Wave 4  
(7% to 13% of respondents). However, there was no  
significant effect of treatment on business ownership or 
equity at Wave 4. 
 
Given the small sample size of people who were saving 
for business, it may not be surprising that we could not 
detect an impact. Perhaps a better test of a matched  
savings program on business ownership would be a  
randomized control trial on a program that targets 
matched saving and financial counseling only for  
microenterprise. Such a program could use a design  
similar to the learn$ave program, but with a greater focus 
on business, rather than education. 
 
Retirement 
Among treatment group members present at Wave 4, 
about 19% of the sample had planned to save for  
retirement. Participants saving for retirement were among 
the most likely to make a matched withdrawal. Among all 
the matched withdrawals made, 16.8% were made for 
retirement savings. However, we observe no statistically 
significant differences between treatment and control 
with regard to retirement savings outcomes.  
 
Net Worth 
Our findings indicate that there is no detectible treatment 
effect of the IDA program on wealth 10 years after the 
program began.  This may be partly due to the nature of 
the data. To provide some context, a difference in net 
worth of less than $10,500 probably would not show  
statistical significance due to the small sample size.  
Looking at the effects on the components of wealth, the 
results are mixed. After adjusting for outliers, there is a 
substantial but not significant increase in total assets and 
total debts with assignment to treatment. There is a  
marginally significant but economically small effect of 
treatment on liquid assets: assignment to treatment is 
associated with $79 more in liquid assets relative to  
assignment to control.  
 
Despite the mixed results on wealth, the study  
participants in both groups are doing better relative to 
national patterns of wealth for low-income households. 
According to recent research from the Pew Charitable 
Trusts, lower-income and minority households in the U.S. 
experienced major declines in wealth in the past 10 years 
(Kochhar et al., 2011). This loss in wealth is not observed 
among this sample, suggesting that the participants – 
both treatment and control group members – were able 
to maintain their financial wealth better than other  
low-income families across the country. 
 
Concluding Thoughts  
In summary, out of the five allowable uses, we find some 
long-term impact of IDAs on education, especially for 
males, and on home maintenance and repair. We do not 
find a long-term impact on homeownership, businesses, 
and retirement savings. The positive findings for  
education and home maintenance and repair may  
suggest that IDAs are best suited to support asset  
purchases that can be accomplished incrementally over a 
period of time. Targeting IDAs for education and home 
maintenance and repair may be more effective than  
applying them to “all-or-nothing” purchases like a house. 
Similarly, these findings may imply that longer savings 
periods would be beneficial. 
 
There are several possible explanations for the lack of 
more substantial effects on wealth and assets found 6 
years after the experiment ended. First, ADD4 participants 
were self-selected into the study. The applicants had to 
take the time and effort to apply for the IDA program; 
thus, they were more motivated than other potentially 
eligible persons. That higher level of motivation may have 
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led members of the control group to find other ways to 
reach their goals, including participation in other  
programs. If this is the case, a larger IDA program that 
includes a less motivated population or is implemented 
in a location with fewer alternative resources may show 
different results. Second, our sample size may be too 
small, and therefore the power too weak to detect an 
impact. Third, the structure of the Tulsa IDA program, 
which allowed for five different qualified uses of the 
matched funds, could make effects even harder to detect. 
Fourth, noise and errors inherent in income, asset, and 
liabilities measures make it challenging to study and  
document changes in wealth. Fifth, in spite of random 
assignment, some baseline differences were observed 
between treatment and control group members. In  
addition to these observed characteristics that were  
controlled in the analysis, unobserved differences  
between the groups could still exist and, if present, could 
affect the impact of IDAs on the observed outcomes. 
 
Finally, long-term efficacy of impacts is a lot to expect 
from a short-term matched savings program. It is not 
uncommon to find that impacts of social and economic 
interventions deteriorate over time, after the treatment 
group no longer enjoys special conditions compared to 
the control group. Further, it raises a broader question of 
whether a short-term program that provides modest 
benefits to program participants can outweigh the many 
other factors that influence ones’ social and economic 
outcomes. At the outset of the experiment, there was 
little way to know the appropriate design or “dose” of 
IDAs—in program structure, saving incentives, or saving 
duration. Program benefits may have to be greater or the 
programs may need to have longer savings periods to 
result in effects on wealth and assets 6 years after  
participation ends. 
 
Future Research 
The ADD4 research has provided important insights into 
the long-term effect of short-term IDAs on economic, 
psychological, and health outcomes among low-income 
families. The mixed effects of the treatment on program 
participants indicate a need for additional research on 
IDA programs in particular and asset-building efforts in 
general.  
 
The Tulsa IDA program in this experiment was among the 
first IDA programs in the country when it started in 1998. 
At the outset, there was little way to know the  
appropriate design for an IDA, including program  
structure, saving incentive, and saving duration. Based on 
field experience in the intervening years, many current 
IDA programs are structured differently in terms of match 
rates, maximum available matches, duration, qualified 
uses of the matching funds, and so on.  
 
Specifically, most of the IDA programs today, funded 
through the federal AFI program, offer a saving period of 
up to 5 years (U.S. Department of Health and Human  
Services 2010). Therefore, the upcoming evaluation of AFI
- funded IDA programs, mandated by AFI’s authorizing 
legislation, should provide new and important evidence 
on the impact of IDAs. Evaluating the effects of several 
contemporary AFI-funded IDA programs will help to  
address some of the challenges in generalizing findings 
from the Tulsa IDA program to other settings and  
program designs. It is reasonable to expect that different 
agencies, regions, and time periods will produce IDA  
programs with different impacts on participants.  
 
Moreover, regarding program duration, we still lack 
knowledge of the effects of a long-term or indefinite IDA 
savings program, structured as a 401(k), for example, 
without a predetermined savings period. The original  
proposal for IDAs was for lifelong, progressive accounts 
(Sherraden, 1991). However, IDAs have been implemented 
in a demonstration period with short-term savings  
periods. It seems likely that longer-term saving could be 
more effective for asset accumulation and that short-term 
savings periods may be too limited to make a lasting  
difference. Future research on the question of what might 
happen with long-term (or life-long) matched savings 
programs would be valuable to inform economic policy. 
 
Also, because IDAs are made up of a bundle of services, it 
would be valuable for both policy and research reasons to 
understand the channels through which IDAs may affect 
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behavior and well-being. For example, experimental  
evidence from the Canadian learn$ave program indicates 
that financial education and case management had a  
significant impact on saving and education outcomes 
(Leckie, et al. 2010). Learning more about the mechanisms 
through which participation in IDAs can lead to positive 
outcomes will provide an evidence base to better  
structure matched savings policies and programs for 
maximum efficacy. 
 
With regard to increasing our understanding of asset 
building in general, an important follow-up question from 
ADD4 is how and why participants in the Tulsa IDA  
experiment—treatment and control group members 
alike—increased their homeownership rates by more than 
a random sample of low-income households (as  
evidenced by the comparison with respondents from the 
PSID) and had low levels of mortgage delinquency and 
foreclosure. This is particularly important given that the 
study period included a time during which the economy 
in general and housing markets in particular experienced 
great turbulence.  
 
To date, ADD-based research has made foundational 
contributions to the field of asset-building and has been 
instrumental in the development of new policies and  
programs to promote economic and social mobility 
among low-income families, including matched savings 
accounts for adults and children, both in the U.S. and  
internationally. This 10-year follow-up study is one more 
contribution to our understanding on the impact of these 
programs. Future research should build on this work and 
provide additional evidence to inform the development 
of future savings and asset-building programs for  
low-income families. 
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